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Abstract
Nowadays, the most widely used cryptosystems are based on either the difficulty
of factoring integers or the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in some
group. These cryptosystems are threatened by the quantum computers. Among
the candidate cryptosystems for the post-quantum era are the code based cryp-
tosystems. These cryptosystems were originally designed with the use of linear
Hamming metric codes. Further proposals were presented where the codes are
replaced with rank metric codes.
A good class of codes suited for cryptography are the maximum rank distance
(MRD) codes. A particular example are the Gabidulin codes. But cryptosystems
using them were shown to be vulnerable against some attack. In the first part
of this thesis, we show that when we work in large field, most linear rank metric
codes are maximum rank distance codes. Furthermore, only a few of them are
Gabidulin codes. We confirm this result by a construction using derivation on
polynomial rings. Another class, discovered by Sheekey, are the twisted Gabidulin
codes.
The second part of this thesis is devoted to the decoding algorithms for the
class of twisted Gabidulin codes. One of the algorithm is completely new, even
when we apply it to the class of Gabidulin codes. Namely, with some interpolation
of linearized polynomials we can modify the problem of decoding in rank metric
to the problem of finding the linear feedback-shift register with least order which
generates some sequence. The idea here is that the rank of a vector is equivalent
to some linear complexity. This gives us the idea of working further with linear
feedback shift register.
In the last part of the thesis, we focus on this notion of linear complexity.
However, we switch back to the setting with Hamming metric. In fact, the lin-
ear complexity of some sequence with fixed period corresponds to the Hamming
weight of some vector. We then generalize this result by considering the linear
complexity of some sequence where the period is arbitrary. We construct a new
metric by using the linear complexity of these arbitrary sequences. We develop a
coding theory with this linear complexity metric and we show some results like a
construction of optimal codes. We will give a formula, with proof, of the number
of sequences with given linear complexity. Having this new theory, finally, we
consider the codes based on the linear complexity and we design a new cryp-
tosystem using these codes. As a basis for the security of the cryptosystem, we
will show that decoding random linear codes with respect to the linear complexity
metric is a difficult problem.
i
Zusammenfassung
Die kryptografischen Systeme, die heutzutage am häufigsten verwendet werden,
basieren entweder auf der (mathematischen) Schwierigkeit des Faktorisierens
ganzer Zahlen oder der Berechnung des diskreten Logarithmus in einer Gruppen-
struktur. In der Erwartung der Quantumcomputern sind diese kryptografischen
Systeme jedoch bedroht. Mögliche Kandidaten für sogenannte post-quantum
Kryptosysteme, sind unter anderem Systeme basierend auf der Theorie von Codes.
Ursprünglich verwenden diese Systeme lineare Codes der Hamming Metrik, in-
dessen gibt es auch Vorschläge für Systeme, welche eine andere Metrik, nämlich
die Rang Metrik in Betracht ziehen.
Dabei haben sich die Codes mit maximaler Rang Distanz (MRD) als eine
gute Wahl für kryptografische Zwecke erwiesen. Ein wichtiges Beispiel solcher
Codes sind die Gabidulin Codes. Bedauerlicherweise erwiesen sich diese Systeme
als anfällig gegen Angriffe. In dem ersten Teil dieser Arbeit zeigen wir, dass in
grossen endlichen Körper die Eigenschaft maximalen Rang Distanz zu besitzen,
generisch ist. Des Weiteren, sind nur wenige dieser MRD Codes Gabidulin Codes.
Dieses Resultat unterlegen wir durch eine Konstruktion von solchen Codes mit
Hilfe von Ableitungen in Polynomringen. Der sogenannte gedrehte (“twisted”)
Gabidulin Code ist ein weiterer MRD Code und wurde erst kürzlich von Sheekey
entdeckt.
Im zweiten Teil dieser Arbeit konzentrieren wir uns auf Dekodierungs Algo-
rithmen für gedrehte Gabidulin Codes. Einer dieser Algorithmen verwendet eine
vollständig neue Idee, auch wenn wir ihn auf die Klasse der Gabidulin Codes
anwenden. Genauer gesagt, können wir mit der Interpolation von linearisierten
Polynomen das Dekodierungs Problem im Rang Metrik Fall übersetzen in das
Finden eines linearen Feedback-Shift Register mit dem kleinsten Grad, der eine
gegebene Folge generiert. Dies basiert auf der Idee, dass der Rang eines Vektors
einer linearen Komplexität entspricht. Daher betrachten wir auch im Weiteren
lineare Feedback-Shift Register.
Im letzten Teil dieser Arbeit fokussieren wir uns auf den Begriff der linearen
Komplexität. Hierfür betrachten wir jedoch wieder die Hamming Metrik. Tat-
sächlich stimmt die lineare Komplexität von einigen Folgen mit gegebener Pe-
riode überein mit dem Hamming Gewicht eines Vektors. Wir verallgemeinern
dieses Resultat durch in Betrachtziehung der linearen Komplexität einer Folge
mit beliebiger Periode. In diesem Sinne konstruieren wir eine neue Metrik mittels
der linearen Komplexität der beliebigen Folgen. Wir etablieren eine vollständige
Theorie um die Codes dieser neuen Metrik, unter anderem konstruieren wir op-
timale Codes der linearen Komplexitäts Metrik. Wir bestimmen (und beweisen)
die Anzahl der Folgen mit einer gegebenen linearen Komplexität. Mit dieser
neuen Theorie können wir letztlich ein neues kryptografisches System vorschla-
ii
gen, welches lineare Komplexitäts Codes verwendet. Bezüglich der Sicherheit
dieses kryptografischen Systems zeigen wir, dass das Dekodieren eines zufälligen
linearen Komplexitäts Codes ein schwieriges Problem ist.
iii
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Introduction
Nowadays, data transmission is a very important aspect of our everyday life.
Two important aspects are the concepts of security and reliability. Security
can be addressed by cryptography while if we want reliability, we can improve
it by using coding theory. The area of cryptography and coding theory are
somewhat contradictory. In cryptography, we want to hide transmission from
everyone except the intended receiver by using a cryptosystem, while with coding
theory, we want everyone to be able to receive the message by using codes.
However, they share a common aspect: they are all about the transmission of
information. Linear codes can be used to adress them. First of all, coding
theory has applications in data storage, data transmission and network coding.
Furthermore a lot of cryptosystems were provided where the underlying security
is based on the difficulty of some problems in coding theory. The advantage
of using these code based cryptosystems is that they are quantum computer
resistant i.e. there is not yet any efficient attack against cryptosystems based on
linear codes. In opposite, most of the cryptosytems used nowadays are based on
the difficulty of factoring integers (RSA for example) and the difficulty of solving
the discrete logarithm problem in some group (Elliptic curves for example). These
cryptosystems are not secure since there are already some algorithms to break
them in case a powerful quantum computer would become available [BBD08].
And thus finding alternative cryptosystems and codes are important.
This chapter is a brief introduction about the tools needed in this thesis. First
we will give brief results from finite field theory and then we look at the concept
of linear codes. And finally, we will show how to get cryptosystems using linear
codes.
1
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1.1 Finite field and vector spaces
Most constructions of linear codes are done over a finite field. In this section,
we recall some results which we will need later in this thesis.
Definition 1. Let Fqm/Fq be a finite field extension of degree m. The trace of
α ∈ Fqm over Fq is given by
Tr(α) =
m−1∑
i=0
αq
i
.
The norm of α ∈ Fqm over Fq is defined by
N(α) =
m−1∏
i=0
αq
i
.
The trace map satisfies the following properties.
Lemma 1.
(i) Tr is a surjective Fq-linear map Fqm → Fq.
(ii) All Fq-linear maps Fqm → Fq are of the form x 7→ Tr(αx) for some
α ∈ Fqm .
Suppose that s, 0 < s < m is an integer satisfying gcd(m, s) = 1. We set
the map φs as
φs : Fqm → Fqm
α 7→ αqs − α.
This map is connected to the trace map in the following way.
Lemma 2.
(i) If s is an integer such that gcd(m, s) = 1, then φs(α) = 0 if and only if
α ∈ Fq.
(ii) KerTr = Imφs for gcd(s,m) = 1 and it has qm−1 elements.
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are standard results in finite field theory. For a proof,
one can have a look at [LN96], Chapter 2, Section 3.
Now suppose that GLn(q) is the set of all invertible square matrices in Fn×nq .
By simple counting, the number of k dimensional subspaces of Fnq is given by,(
n
k
)
q
:=
k−1∏
i=0
qn − qi
qk − qi =
∏k−1
i=0 (qn − qi)
]GLk(q)
.
And in the same way, one can show the following Lemma. A full proof can
be found in [NHTRR18].
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Lemma 3. Let k, n be two positive integers with k ≤ n2 and let U be a k-
dimensional vector subspace of Fnq . Then for arbitrary r = 0, · · · , k, the number
of k-dimensional subspaces intersecting withU in a (k−r)-dimensional subspace
is (
k
k − r
)
q
(
n− k
r
)
q
qr
2
.
1.2 Hamming metric codes
Let q be a power of a prime. In this section, Fq denotes a finite field with q
elements.
Definition 2. A code C of length n over Fq is a subset of Fnq . C is called a linear
code if C is a subspace of Fnq over Fq and if the dimension of C is k we describe
the parameters of C as [n, k].
Messages are sent as vectors x ∈ C over the network and errors may happen.
The errors are elements of Fnq and they are quantified by the weight. Let 0
denote the vector whose elements are all zero.
Definition 3. Let x ∈ Fnq . The weight of x = (x1, · · · , xn) is defined by
w(x) = ]{i : xi 6= 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
The weight satisfies the triangular inequality and this allows us to define a
distance of Fnq .
Definition 4. Let x and y be two elements of Fnq . Then the Hamming distance
between x and y is given by
dH(x,y) = w(x− y).
Another important parameters for codes is the notion of minimum distance.
Definition 5. Let C be a code of length n over Fq. Then the minimum distance
d of C is
d = min
x 6=y∈C
dH(x,y).
If C is linear then this is simply given by d = minx∈C\{0}w(x). And if k is the
dimension of C as a linear code, we describe the code as [n, k, d].
Theorem 1 (Singleton bound, [MS78]). Let C be an [n, k, d]-linear code over a
finite field Fq of size q. Then
d ≤ n− k + 1.
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If d = n − k + 1, then C is called a maximum distance separable (MDS)
code. MDS codes exist when the field is large enough as we see in the following
example.
Example 1 (Reed-Solomon codes). Let Fq be a finite field of size q where its ele-
ments are denoted by a1, · · · , aq. Let n ≤ q. We define the following evaluation
map
ev : Fq[x]→ Fnq
f(x) 7→ (f(a1), · · · , f(an)).
If we denote the set of polynomials of degree at most k−1 over Fq by Fq[x]<k,
then the image C = ev (Fq[x]<k) of Fq[x]<k by the evaluation map above is an
MDS code and it is called a Reed-Solomon code [MS78]. To see this, we use
the fact that a polynomial of degree k − 1 has k − 1 roots at most. Therefore,
n− k + 1 elements of (f(a1), · · · , f(an)) are non-zero.
The nice thing about Reed-Solomon codes is that they have efficient decoding
algorithms [MS78]. If we equip Fnq with the bilinear form defined by the usual
dot product, then we can define the orthogonal complement of C in Fnq . This
vector space is called the dual code of C and we denote it by C⊥. The generator
matrix of C⊥ is called the parity check matrix of C. Parity check matrices are
usually denoted by the letter H and they are of size (n− k)× n.
1.3 Rank metric codes
This class of codes again consists of some vector space over finite field. But the
notion “rank” in the name was introduce by Gabidulin when he used a metric
different from the Hamming metric. With rank metric codes, we have to work
with larger fields. Let q be a power of a prime and let m be a positive integer.
Let Fqm/Fq be the finite field extension of degree m. For rank metric codes we
will need a new type of metric. Let n be a positive integer and let Fm×nq denote
the set of (m× n)-matrices over Fq.
We know that Fqm is a vector space over the field Fq. So, if we fix a basis
(α1, · · · , αm) of Fqm/Fq, then we can define an isomorphism
V : Fqm → Fmq
(x1α1 + · · ·+ xmαm)→ (x1, · · · , xm)T
This in turn defines an isomorphism M , with
M : Fnqm → Fm×nq
(a1, · · · , an)→ (V (a1), · · · , V (an)).
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Definition 6. Let x and y be two elements of Fnqm . We define the rank distance
between x and y as
dR(x,y) = rank(M(x)−M(y)).
The rank weight of x is defined by rank x = rankM(x).
Having this new metric we can now define a rank metric code.
Definition 7. Let Fqm/Fq be a finite field extension of degree m and let n be
an integer. A rank metric code C of length n is a subset of Fnqm together with
the metric defined in Definition 6. C is called a linear rank metric code if it is
linear over Fqm . In this case, if k is its dimension as a vector space, then we
write [m× n, k] to describe the code.
And we also have the notion of minimum distance.
Definition 8. Let C be rank metric code of length n over the extension Fqm/Fq.
Then the minimum distance d of C is
d = min
x 6=y∈C
dR(x,y).
If C is linear then this is simply given by d = minx∈C\{0} rank(M(x)). And if k
is the dimension of C as a linear code, we describe the code as [m× n, k, d].
The version of the Singleton bound is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Singleton bound, [Gab85]). Let C be an [m× n, k, d] rank metric
code of length n over the extension Fqm/Fq. Suppose that n ≤ m. Then
d ≤ n − k + 1. In case d = n − k + 1, C is called a maximum rank distance
MRD code.
Remark 1. In Definitions 6, 7, 8 and Theorem 2, we used the extension Fqm/Fq.
It is possible to generalize all definitions and results stated for any finite field
extension L/K, even when the fields are infinite. The proof of Theorem 2 is
essentially the same as with the classical extension Fqm/Fq. Notice also that we
consider only linear codes.
Remark 2. In Theorem 2, we have used the condition n ≤ m. This is the most
interesting case for us in this thesis but a slightly different statement holds when
n > m [Loi08]. Also, the construction which we will see later can be modified to
get an MRD code in this case by using the mapM and transposition of matrices.
In the remaining part of this section, we will consider only [m× n, k, d]-rank
metric codes with n ≤ m. The construction of an MRD code is similar to the
construction of Reed-Solomon codes but it needs a special class of polynomials.
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Definition 9 (Linearized polynomials). Let Fqm/Fq be a field extension of degree
m. A q-linearized polynomial over Fqm is a polynomial in Fqm [x] of the form
f(x) = a0x+ a1xq + · · ·+ alxql .
The set of q-linearized polynomial over Fqm is denoted by Lq,m[x] and the set of
q-linearized polynomial of degree qk−1 at most is denoted by Lq,m[x]<k.
The q-linearized polynomials form an interesting ring where the multiplication
is the composition of polynomials. Moreover any f(x) ∈ Lq,m[x] is an Fq-linear
map
f : Fqm → Fqm , x 7→ f(x).
Having all of these, we can now explain the construction of MRD code.
Example 2 (Gabidulin codes). Let Fqm/Fq be a finite field extension of degree m
where the basis is given by {a1, · · · , am}. Let n ≤ m. We define the following
evaluation map
qev : Fqm [x]→ Fnqm
f(x) 7→ (f(a1), · · · , f(an))
The image C = qev (Lq,m[x]<k) of Lq,m[x]<k by the evaluation map above is an
MRD code. It is called a Gabidulin code. They were independently discovered
by Gabidulin [Gab85] and Delsarte [Del78]. To see that it is MRD, we use the
fact that a polynomial of degree qk−1 has qk−1 roots at most. Since q-linearized
polynomials are Fq-linear maps on Fqm , we can use the rank nullity theorem to
show that rank (M((f(a1), · · · , f(an))) is at least n− k + 1.
As with the case of Reed-Solomon codes, Gabidulin codes have efficient de-
coding algorithms [Gab85, Loi06]. Furthermore, the notion of dual codes and
parity check matrix is exactly the same as with the Hamming metric.
1.4 Cryptosystem based on linear codes
Linear codes have applications in data transmission, data storage, network cod-
ing. Apart from those, linear codes have also found applications in Cryptography.
The use of Hamming metric codes were first suggested by McEliece for use in
cryptography [McE78]. The cryptosystem is based on the difficulty of solving
the following problem.
Coset weights problem (CWP): Let w be a positive integer. Let C be a
random linear code over a finite field F together with the Hamming distance dh.
Given a vector x ∈ Fn. Find the codeword c ∈ C such that dh(x, c) ≤ w.
We first defined the notion of hardness of a problem.
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Definition 10. A problem P is said to be in NP if given a solution to P , we can
check in polynomial time (with respect to the size of the input) that it is indeed
a solution.
Here, we give an equivalent definition of NP. Usually, NP problems are de-
fined to be the problems which can be solved in polynomial time using a non-
deterministic Turing machine.
Definition 11. A problem P is called NP-hard if it is proven that any problem
in NP can be reduced to P in polynomial time. That means that any problem in
NP can be transformed into an instance of the problem P with some polynomial
time operations.
Definition 12. If a problem is both NP and NP-hard, then it is called NP-
complete.
NP-complete problems are considered to be difficult to solve, i.e. it is believed
that they require exponential time algorithm. An example of an NP-complete
problem is the coset weights problem. This was shown in [BMvT78] and we
can interpret the result as solving the coset weights problem is in general a hard
problem. A somehow equivalent problem is the problem of finding the minimum
distance of binary linear code. This was also shown to be hard in [Var97].
This property is used to construct one way functions which are difficult to
invert. However, there are some particular classes of linear codes for which there
is a decoding algorithm. Such decoding algorithms are used as a trapdoor for the
one way function, thus enabling the construction of public key cryptosystems.
Here is a general description of the cryptosystem using linear Hamming metric
codes.
Let q be a power of a prime. Suppose that C is an [n, k, d]-linear code over
Fq with a metric defined by dH . Let G ∈ Fk×n be a generator matrix of C and
we also use it to denote the encoding map for C. Let t = dd2e. We suppose thatD is an efficient decoding algorithm of C which can correct any error vectors with
Hamming weight less than t. We define the following public key cryptosystem.
We want to encrypt a message m ∈ Fkq into a ciphertext c ∈ Fnq .
(I) Public key: G, t
(II) Secret key: D
(III) Encryption: Choose a random vector e ∈ Fnq with Hamming weight less
than t. Then c = mG+ e.
(IV) Decryption: Compute m′ = mG = D(c) using the decoding algorithm.
m = m′G−1. Here G−1 means the inverse of the injective mapping
m′ 7→m′G−1. An invertible (k× k)-submatrix of G can be used for this.
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In general, we want to choose the code C such that the generator matrix G
should not show an apparent structure of the code. In this regard, it should not
be possible for an attacker to find a decoding algorithm D given the generator
matrix G. To hide any visible structure on the generator matrix G, it was
originally suggested to use a permutation matrix P ∈ Fn×nq and an invertible
matrix S ∈ Fk×kq , which are kept secret. The public generator matrix is therefore
G′ = SGP. To decrypt mG′ + e = mSGP + e, we notice that multiplying
by the secret P−1 does not change the Hamming weight. Thus the decoding
algorithm applied onmSG+eP−1 should producemSG. Then we just compute
mS by using the inverse map G−1 and then apply S−1 to recover m.
The first cryptosystem based on linear codes was the McEliece cryptosystem
and it uses classical Goppa codes [McE78]. The construction of Goppa codes is
given as follows, it was discovered by V. D. Goppa in [Gop70].
We define a polynomial g(x) of degree t over a finite field F2m . Let a1, · · · , an
be distinct elements of F2m such that g(ai) 6= 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The binary Goppa
codes are defined to be the vector space C ⊂ Fn2 such that
C =
{
(c1, · · · , cn) :
n∑
i=1
ci
x− ai ≡ 0 mod g(x)
}
.
Goppa codes have dimension n −mt at least and if we choose g(x) not to
have multiple roots, then we can show that these codes have minimum distance
2t + 1. This class of codes have an efficient decoding algorithm. For more
information of Goppa codes, one can have a look at [Ber73].
Although there are methods to distinguish high rate Goppa codes from ran-
dom codes, general Goppa codes have many properties similar to random codes
[FGUaO+11]. This gives the original McEliece cryptosystem the strength to with-
stand attacks. Namely, after forty years of extensive research, the cryptosystem
is still structurally secure. The original parameters suggested by McEliece were
proven to be insecure as it is shown in [BLP08]. One way to design secure pa-
rameters for cryptosystems based on linear codes is to check its security against
a general algorithm for decoding any linear codes. A reference for that is the op-
timized version of the information set decoding algorithm presented in [BLP08].
In that work, they have suggested the following parameters for the McEliece cryp-
tosystem using Goppa codes. For 80-bit security, i.e. the fastest attack against
the cryptosystem needs approximately O(280) operations, the public-key size is
520 Kbits. For 128-bit security, the public-key size is 1537 Kbits. This is the
main drawback of the McEliece cryptosystem. It requires the use of large codes
and therefore the public key sizes are large. This makes it impractical compared
to RSA and Elliptic curves based cryptosystems. Notice that the article was pub-
lished 10 years ago so that further improvement of that algorithm should make
the key sizes worse.
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Due to this, several methods were suggested to reduce the key sizes. Nieder-
reiter suggested the use of Reed-Solomon codes instead of Goppa codes [Nie86].
Since these codes have a larger error correcting capability, they can be used to
reduce the key sizes. In Niederreiter’s proposal, he uses an equivalent version
of the cryptosystem by using the parity check matrix of the code instead of the
generator matrix. The cryptosystem is described as follows.
Let q be a power of a prime. Suppose that C is an [n, k, d]-linear code over
Fq with a metric defined by dH . Let H ∈ F(n−k)×n be a parity check matrix
of C. Let P ∈ Fn×nq be a permutation matrix and let S ∈ F(n−k)×(n−k)q be an
irreducible matrix. Let t = dd2e. We suppose that D is an efficient decoding
algorithm of C which can correct error vectors with weight less than t. In fact
D is an algorithm such that given a syndrome HeT , we can uniquely compute
e provided that its weight is small enough. We define the following public key
cryptosystem. Messages are represented by error vectors e of weight t at most
and we encrypt them into a ciphertext c ∈ Fn−kq .
(I) Public key: H′ = SHP, t
(II) Secret key: D,S,P
(III) Encryption: The ciphertext is the syndrome c = H′eT .
(IV) Decryption: Compute c′ = S−1c = HPeT . The decoding algorithm D
on c′ should help us to recover the error PeT . Finally using P−1 gives us
the message e.
Remark 3. Notice that in the previous cryptosystem, we also incorporated the
matrices S and P for hiding the structure of H.
It was shown in [LDW94] that in terms of security, the McEliece version is
equivalent to the Niederreiter version. However, the Niederreiter version allows
the use of parity check matrices in systematic form and thus reduces the key
sizes further. Also, the Niederreiter version can be used to produce a signature
scheme [CFS01].
It was again proven that the use of Reed-Solomon codes was not enough.
Namely, Sidelnikov and Shestakov showed that it is possible to recover a decoding
algorithm by recovering the structure of generator matrix of the codes [SS92].
For decades, several proposal were made to overcome the problem of large key
sizes. We classify these into three main parts.
Alternative constructions of codes
(i) Alternative codes: Reed-Solomon codes [Nie86], Low (Medium) density
parity-check codes – L(M)DPC [MRS00, BC07], Srivastava codes [Per12],
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algebraic-geometric codes [JM96] etc... Most of these alternatives were
shown to be insecure [SS92, CMCP14, MRS00, BC07]. However, using
Srivastava codes is considered to be safe. That is also due to its construction
similar to Goppa codes but then, it also suffers the same problem with the
key sizes.
(ii) Subcodes of Generalized Reed-Solomon codes: One example of attack is
by using the Schur product [Wie10].
(iii) Codes with symmetry: quasi-cyclic, quasi-dyadic (L(M)DPC codes, Goppa
codes, Srivastava codes) [BCGO09, Per12, BC07, MB09]: Using symmetry
on the generator matrix of the codes, only a part of the generator matrix
needs to be published and thus reducing the key sizes. There are attacks
on some of these constructions [OTD10, GJS16].
Alternative methods for hiding the structure of the codes
The idea of replacing the permutation matrix P by a more general matrix allows
to hide the structure of the original codes [BBC+16, BGLK+17]. These methods
were mainly considered with the use of Reed-Solomon codes. However some
attacks are possible, still by exploiting the structure of Reed-Solomon codes
[CGGU+14].
As we can see above, many of the cryptosystems above are using Reed-
Solomon codes. That is mainly because Reed-Solomon codes are MDS, and thus
it is optimal in a sense that it allows us to use linear codes with smaller length and
thus reducing the key sizes. However, we may also notice that cryptosystems
using Reed-Solomon codes were frequently shown to be insecure. The main
reason is that Reed-Solomon codes have too much structure which can be used
to distinguish it from random linear codes. This is explained by the following.
Definition 13. For two vectors x = (x1, · · · , xn) and y = (y1, · · · , yn) in Fnq ,
the Schur product x ∗ y is the vector (x1y1, · · · , xnyn). The Schur product of
two linear codes C1 and C2 is the vector space defined by
C1 ∗ C2 = SpanFq ({x ∗ y : x ∈ C1,y ∈ C2}) .
For a linear code C, C2 := C ∗ C is called the square code of C.
The Schur product of Reed-Solomon codes have the following property.
Proposition 1. Let C be a Reed Solomon code of length n and dimension
k ≤ n/2, then the square code of C is a Reed Solomon code of dimension
2k − 1.
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This is a particular property for Reed-Somon codes. As it was presented in
[CGGU+14], this is not in general true for random codes. Namely, for a random
linear code of dimension k and length n, the dimension of the square code is
expected to be min
(
n,
(
k + 1
2
))
.
Use of rank metric codes
Apart from using different classes of linear Hamming metric codes, it was also
suggested to use a different metric. Namely, the rank metric codes offers advan-
tages against the classical Hamming metric to reduce the large key sizes. This
cryptosystem is exactly similar to the McEliece cryptosystem with the Hamming
metric, except that we use rank metric codes in Fnqm and we measure the weight
of the error vectors by using the rank distance dR. The linear codes are Fqm-
subspaces of Fnqm . Furthermore, instead of using permutation matrices to hide
the structure of the generator matrix we can use invertible matrices in Fn×nq .
The analogy to the Hamming metric here is that, if in the Hamming metric the
permutation matrices leave the Hamming weight invariant, in the rank metric
setting, the invertible matrices in Fn×nq leave the rank weight invariant.
A proposal was given by Gabidulin et al. in [GPT91]. This cryptosystem
is using Gabidulin codes [Gab85], which we have defined in Example 2. Since
Gabidulin codes are analogous to the Reed-Solomon codes, it is probably not
surprising for the reader that cryptosystems based on Gabidulin codes are mostly
insecure. In analogy to Reed-Solomon codes, there is also a distinguisher for
Gabidulin codes. We will see such property in Chapter 2, Lemma 7. Another idea
to see the weakness is that when multiplying a generator matrix of a Gabidulin
code with an invertible matrix in Fn×nq , we still have a generator matrix of a
Gabidulin code but with different support vector. To avoid an attack similar to
the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack in [SS92], a distortion matrix is used: the public
generator matrix is of the form G′ = S([G|X])P. The distortion matrix X is
used so that the algebraic structure of the generator matrix G is removed.
We describe the cryptosystem using Gabidulin codes in the following.
Let q be a power of a prime. Suppose that C is an [n, k, d] Gabidulin code de-
fined over the extension field Fqm/Fq. Let G ∈ Fk×n be a generator matrix of C.
We use a distortion matrix X ∈ Fk×t1qm with the following property: the columns
of X generates an Fq-vector space of dimension t1. Let P ∈ F(n+t1)×(n+t1)q be an
invertible matrix and let S ∈ Fk×kqm be another invertible matrix. Let t = d2 . We
suppose that D is an efficient decoding algorithm of C which can error vectors
with weight less than t. A messagem is an element of Fkqm and we encrypt them
into a ciphertext c ∈ Fn+t1qm .
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(I) Public key: G′ = S([G|X])P, t− t1
(II) Secret key: D,S,P
(III) Encryption: Choose a random vector e ∈ Fnq with rank weight less than
t− t1. Then c = mG′ + e.
(IV) Decryption: Compute c′ = cP−1 = mSG + e1 + e2. Where e1 is the
error of rank weight t1 produced by the distortion matrix X and e2 is
produced by e and it has rank weight t− t1. With the decoding algorithm,
D(c′) = mSG. We can finally recover m by multiplying the last result
with the inverse of G and S.
The distortion matrix X has the effect that intentional errors are initially
introduced in the original codes. This has the consequence that the new code
can correct less errors than the original code. However this helps in hiding the
structure of the original code. Unfortunately the use of distortion matrices is not
enough as attacks were presented whenever counter-attacks were given. For an
extensive reading on this, see [Gib95, GRS16, Ksh07, Gab08, RGH10, HTMR18].
Another proposal is the use of the class of low rank parity-check (LRPC)
codes [GRSZ14]. This is the rank metric version of the LDPC codes.
Again as in the case of Reed-Solomon codes, Gabidulin codes have too much
algebraic structure. This explain the attacks cited above on the cryptosystems
using Gabidulin codes. That particular structure is exploiting the Frobenius mor-
phism φ : x 7→ xq which was used to construct the Gabidulin codes. Recall that
in Example 2 and Definition 9, the construction of the code involves the use of
monomials of the form xqi .
Definition 14. For a vector x = (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ Fnqm , define its image by the
Frobenius morphism as φ(x) = (φ(x1), · · · , φ(xn)). If C is a rank metric code
over the extension Fqm/Fq, then we define the linear code φ(C) as
φ(C) = {φ(x) : x ∈ C} .
It was shown in [HTM17] that if C is an MRD code of dimension k, then
dimFqm C ∩ φ(C) = k − 1 if and only if C is a Gabidulin code. Thus we have
an easy method to recognize a Gabidulin code. This can also be used (like
in [HTMR18]), to mount an attack against cryptosystems based on Gabidulin
codes.
Due to these distinguisher attacks, it is important to find alternative MDS
and MRD codes which still have performance comparable to the Reed-Solomon
and Gabidulin codes.
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Remark 4. In this chapter, all the statements were given with some particular
cases of Reed-Solomon codes and Gabidulin codes. However, with little modifi-
cation if needed, these statements hold when Generalized Reed-Solomon codes
and Generalized Gabidulin codes are considered.
1.5 Summary of the main results of this disser-
tation
Now that we have seen how linear codes are used in cryptography, let us give a
brief overview of what this thesis offers.
This first chapter was mainly about some results which we will need later.
We have defined linear codes, both in the Hamming and rank metric setting.
We have seen how linear codes are used in cryptography. We have presented the
known constructions and we have explained why most of these constructions are
insecure. This leads us to work on the following chapters.
Reed-Solomon and Gabidulin codes were proposed to be used in code based
cryptosystems. Their main advantage is that they are optimal in the sense that
given their parameters, they have the largest possible minimum distance. Con-
sequently, they help in constructing a public key cryptosystems where the public
key size is smaller than in the cryptosystem using classical Goppa codes. How-
ever their main drawback is that they have too much algebraic structures, which
can be exploited to mount some attack on the cryptosystems. Therefore we
want to find alternative linear codes and possibly, ones which are still maximum
rank distance codes or maximum distance separable codes. A step into this di-
rection is the main result of Chapter 2 of this thesis. In that chapter, we will
emphasize more on the side of rank metric codes. There, we show that when
we consider a finite field extension Fqm/Fq, where the fields are large enough,
then most of the linear rank metric codes are MRD codes. In other words, if
one generates a random linear rank metric code, then with high probability, this
code is an MRD code. Moreover, among all of these MRD codes, we prove that
only a tiny part of them are Gabidulin codes. To prove these results, we give
two different methods. The first method is a probabilistic method, where we use
the Schwarz-Zippel lemma. The second method is more geometric. We show
that the set of Gabidulin (resp. MRD) codes contains a non-empty Zariski-open
set and therefore they are generic sets. Therefore, theoretically, there are many
alternative codes which are potential candidates for use in code based cryptosys-
tems. However, first we need to find a general construction for such family of
codes. Secondly, for any proposed code, we must find a decoding algorithm. To
confirm our results about the existence of MRD codes which are not Gabidulin
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codes, we give a new construction of such codes. And our new construction
also confirms the hypothesis that we need to work with large finite fields. To
get such a construction, we had to work with linear rank metric codes over the
polynomial ring Fp[x] and then reduce all codewords in this code modulo some
specific irreducible polynomial f(x). The newly constructed rank metric code
will be over the finite field Fp[x]/(f(x)).
In his paper [She16], Sheekey has given a construction of new MRD codes
other than Gabidulin codes. They are called twisted Gabidulin codes. However,
as we have mentioned before, for linear codes to be used in practice, we need a
decoding algorithm. In Chapter 3, we will give two different decoding algorithms
for these new class of MRD codes. For the first algorithm, we will use an
algorithm similar to the algorithm by Kötter-Kschichang. Their algorithm was
designed to decode Gabidulin codes. Here, we want to have a decoding algorithm
for twisted Gabidulin codes. With some modification on the Kötter-Kschichang
algorithm, we get a decoding algorithm for twisted Gabidulin codes albeit, it
works only for some specific parameters. The second decoding algorithm is
completely different from the first algorithm. It is using the Berlekamp-Massey
algorithm in a different way. First, we develop an algorithm which can be used
for Gabidulin codes. This algorithm is different from any existing algorithm.
The main step consists in interpolating the received message in order to get its
polynomial representation. By the property of Gabidulin codes, we can easily find
some coefficients of the polynomial representing the error vector. By using some
generalization of linear-feedback shift register, we have shown that the previously
known coefficients can be used to recover the whole polynomial representing the
error vector. This algorithm also runs in quadratic time so that it is as fast as
existing algorithms. With some further modifications, we were able to describe
a way to extend this algorithm to the family of twisted Gabidulin codes.
When looking at the Hamming metric equivalent of the second decoding
algorithm in Chapter 3, we got the idea of expanding the notion of Hamming
distance into a more general set by using the notion of linear complexity. Namely,
the notion of Hamming metric is somehow equivalent to the notion of linear
complexity of sequences with some fixed period. So, in this setting, the linear
complexity of sequences defines a metric. In Chapter 4, we have shown this by
using a theorem of König-Rados. Then we consider the case where the sequences
are no longer required to have a fixed period. In this case, we have shown that
linear complexity still defines a metric on sequences of finite length. We therefore
define a new metric using the linear complexity of sequences of finite length and
we will develop a coding theory using this new metric. We will give an exact
formula on the number of finite sequences given a bounded linear complexity
and from this we get the exact formula for the number of sequences with a fixed
linear complexity. That chapter provides the basis of the theory which we need
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when we construct a new cryptosystem.
As we have seen in this chapter, once we have a metric, we can construct
a cryptosystem. In Chapter 5, we will propose a general construction of a new
cryptosystem using the finite sequences and their linear complexity. We will then
give a particular instance together with some parameters. We will indeed show
that this new metric helps in producing a cryptosystem which needs smaller key
size than in the original McEliece cryptosystem. As a basis for the security of
the cryptosystem, we will show that the problem of finding the closest sequence
with respect to the linear complexity metric is difficult in general. Indeed, we
will show that such problem is NP-complete. Finally, we will close this work with
a short conclusion in Chapter 6. There, we recall the main results obtained in
this thesis and we will end with a short description of a future work on the new
cryptosystem.
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Chapter 2
Classes of Maximum rank
distance codes
The four first sections of this Chapter are based on a work I did together
with Alessandro Neri, Anna-Lena Horlemann-Trautmann and Joachim Rosenthal
[NHTRR18]. The section 2.5 is an independent work from myself.
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will always work on rank metric codes over the extension field
Fqm/Fq for a fixed positive integer m and a prime power q. An identity matrix
will be denoted by In if it belongs to Fn×nq .
For an Fqm-linear rank metric code, instead of writing [m× n, k, d], we just
use the notation [n, k, d], where the field Fqm is understood. As we have seen
in Chapter 1, an [n, k, d]-linear rank metric code satisfies the following Singleton
bound: d ≤ n− k+ 1. If this bound is met, i.e. d = n− k+ 1, then the code is
called maximum rank distance (MRD) code. The first construction of MRD codes
were independently presented by Gabidulin [Gab85] and Delsarte [Del78]. These
are the Gabidulin codes which we presented in Chapter 1. Several construction
of non-Gabidulin MRD codes were given in [CMP16, dlCKWW16, She16]. We
show that there are many MRD codes. In this chapter, we will show that the
properties of being MRD and non-Gabidulin are generic. This implies that over a
field extension with large degree, randomly choosing a generator matrix for a rank
metric code will produce, with high probability, an MRD codes. Furthermore, we
will see that among all these MRD codes, Gabidulin codes are just a fraction of
them.
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2.2 Preliminaries
2.2.1 Properties of MRD codes
Definition 15. Let (a1, · · · , an) be elements of Fqm , linearly independent over
Fq. Let gcd(m, s) = 1 and let [i] = qi. The (k × n) s-Moore matrix is defined
by
Ms,k =

a1 a2 · · · an
a
[s]
1 a
[s]
2 · · · a[s]n
...
...
. . .
...
a
[s(k−1)]
1 a
[s(k−1)]
2 · · · a[s(k−1)]n

Using Definition 15, a Gabidulin code is therefore a linear rank metric code
with a generator matrix of the form M1,k. A more general class is given when
s 6= 1 [KG05].
Definition 16 (Generalized Gabidulin codes). For a field extension Fqm/Fq and
an integer n. A Generalized Gabidulin code is a linear rank metric code with
generator matrix Ms,k with gcd(m, s) = 1.
Generalized Gabidulin codes are still MRD.
Lemma 4. Any linear MRD code over Fqm/Fq of length n and dimension k has
a generator matrix G ∈ Fk×nq in systematic form i.e. G = [Ik|X]. Moreover all
the entries of X are not in Fq.
Definition 17. Let C be a linear code of length n over Fqm/Fq. We define the
dual code C⊥ as
C⊥ = {x ∈ Fnqm : xcT = 0,∀c ∈ C}.
A generator matrix of C⊥ is called a parity check matrix of C.
The properties of linear rank metric codes and their dual are related by the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 ([Gab85]). Let C be an MRD (resp. a generalized Gabidulin
code) of dimension k over Fqm/Fq. The dual code C⊥ is an MRD (resp. a
generalized Gabidulin code) code of dimension n− k.
To classify linear codes, we need properties to characterize their classes. For
that, we want to define a notion of equivalence of linear rank metric codes.
Given a linear code C over Fqm/Fq, let c = (c1, · · · , cn) ∈ C. We define
c[i] =
(
c
[i]
1 , · · · , c[i]n
)
.
We also set C[i] = {c[i] : c ∈ C}.
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Definition 18. An isometry on Fnqm with respect to the rank metric is a map
Fnqm → Fnqm which preserves the rank.
A particular classes of isometries on Fnqm is described by the following lemma.
Lemma 5 ([Mor14], Proposition 2). The semilinear Fq-rank isometries on Fnqm
are of the form
(λ,A, σ) ∈
(
F∗qm ×GLn(q)
)
o (Fqm) ,
defined by
(λ,A, σ) : Fnqm → Fnqm
(c1, · · · , cn) 7→ (σ(λc1), · · · , σ(λcn))A.
The nice property of these isometries is that if we apply these semilinear
isometries on a generator matrix of a generalized Gabidulin code, which is a Moore
matrix, then we still get a Moore matrix. In other word, a code is semilinearly
isometric to a generalized Gabidulin code if and only if it is itself a generalized
Gabidulin code.
Now, let us characterize MRD codes.
Proposition 3 (MRD criterion,[HTM17]). Let G ∈ Fk×nqm be the generator ma-
trix of a linear rank metric code over Fqm/Fq. Then C is an MRD code if and
only if
rank
(
AGT
)
= k.
for all A ∈ Fk×nq such that rankA = k.
And for the Gabidulin codes we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (generalized Gabidulin criterion,[HTM17]). Let C be an MRD code
over Fqm/Fq of dimension k. C is a generalized Gabidulin code if an only if there
exists s with gcd(s,m) = 1 such that
dim
(
C ∩ C[s]
)
= k − 1.
2.2.2 The Zariski topology over finite fields
Let Fq[x1, · · · , xr] be a polynomial ring in r variables over Fq. Let Fq be the
algebraic closure of Fq. Let S ⊂ Fq[x1, · · · , xr] be a finite set of polynomials,
then the algebraic set defined by S is defined by
V (S) =
{
x ∈ Fqr : f(x) = 0,∀f ∈ S
}
.
These algebraic sets form the closed sets of a topology in Fq
r. This is called the
Zariski topology. As usual the complements of the Zariski-closed sets are called
the Zariski-open sets.
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Definition 19. A subset G ⊂ Frq is called a generic set if G contains a non-empty
Zariski-open set.
If one has an algebraic set V (S) as we have defined above, then the number
of Fqm-rational points defined through
V (S,Fqm) := {x ∈ Frqm : f(x) = 0,∀f ∈ S},
becomes in proportion to the cardinality of the whole vector space Frqm smaller, as
the extension degree m increases. This is a consequence of the Schwartz-Zippel
Lemma.
Lemma 6 (Schwartz-Zippel,[Sch80]). Let f ∈ Fq[x1, x2, · · · , xr] be a non-zero
polynomial of total degree d ≥ 0. Let Fqm be an extension field and let F ⊂ Fqm
be a finite set. Let v1, v2, · · · , vr be selected at random independently and
uniformly from F . Then the probability that f vanishes on (v1, · · · , vr) satisfies
Pr(f(v1, · · · , vr) = 0) ≤ d
]F
.
2.3 Topological results
We know by Lemma 4 that any linear MRD code in Fnqm of dimension k is uniquely
represented by its generator matrix G ∈ Fk×nqm in systematic form G = [Ik|X].
Thus to an MRD code C corresponds a unique matrix X. To move to the
Zariski topology, we need to work on the algebraic closure. We will show that
the set of matrices fulfilling the MRD criterion of Proposition 3, and the subset
of these matrices not fulfilling the generalized Gabidulin criterion of Theorem 3,
are generic sets over the algebraic closure.
Let us first work on the MRD criterion of Proposition 3.
Theorem 4. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. The set SMRD defined by{
X ∈ Fqmk×(n−k) : ∀A ∈ Fn×kq of rank k and det([Ik|X]A) 6= 0
}
,
is a generic subset of Fqm
k×(n−k).
Proof. First SMRD is non-empty since there are Gabidulin codes for every set of
parameters. SC will denote the complement of a set S. If we denote the entries
of X ∈ Fqmk×(n−k) as the variables x1, · · · , xk(n−k), then for a given A ∈ Fn×kq ,
we have
det([Ik|X]A) ∈ Fq[x1, · · · , xk(n−k)].
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Thus,
SMRD =
⋂
A∈Fn×kq
rankA=k
{X ∈ Fqmk×(n−k) : det([Ik|X]A) 6= 0}
=
⋂
A∈Fn×kq
rankA=k
V (det([Ik|X]A))C ,
i.e. it is a finite intersection of Zariski-open sets. Therefore, SMRD is a Zariski-
open set.
Moving to the generalized Gabidulin codes. We have the following Criterion.
Lemma 7. Let C be a linear code of length n and dimension k over Fqm/Fq
with generator matrix [Ik|X] and let 0 < s < m with gcd(s,m) = 1. C is a
generalized Gabidulin code with parameter s if and only if rank(X[s] −X) = 1.
Proof. We know that
dim(C ∩ C[s]) = k − 1
⇔ rank
[
Ik X
Ik X[s]
]
= k + 1
⇔ rank
[
Ik X
0 X[s] −X
]
= k + 1
⇔ rank(X[s] −X) = 1.
We complete the result with Theorem 3.
Now, we show that the set of generator matrices which does not satisfy the
properties in Lemma 7 is a generic set.
Theorem 5. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1 and 0 < s < m be integers with gcd(s,m) = 1.
Suppose that
SGab,s := {X ∈ Fqmk×(n−k) : rank(X[s] −X) = 1} ∩ SMRD.
The set SGab,s is a Zariski-closed subset of the Zariski-open set SMRD.
Proof. Let X ∈ SGab,s. Since X ∈ SMRD, by Lemma 4, Xij /∈ Fq for i =
1, · · · , k and j = 1, · · · , n − k. Then rank(X[s] − X) = 1 is equivalent to
rank(X[s] − X) < 2 which is the same as all (2 × 2)-minors of X[s] − X are
zero.
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Again, we denote the entries of X by the variables x1, · · · , xn(n−k). The
(2 × 2)-minors are again polynomials in Fq[x1, · · · , xn(n−k)] and suppose that
they form the set S ′. Then
SGab,s = {X ∈ Fqmk×(n−k) : f(x1, · · · , xk(n−k)) = 0, ∀f ∈ S ′} ∩ SMRD
= V (S ′) ∩ SMRD.
Hence it is a Zariski-closed subset of SMRD ⊂ Fqmk×(n−k).
By Theorem 5, the complement of SGab,s in SMRD, i.e the set of MRD but
not Gabidulin codes, is a Zariski-open subset of SMRD. Thus, if it is non-empty,
it is a generic set. In the following section, we will give conditions on the non-
emptiness of the set.
Translating the results above, we can say that when we randomly generate
X over the algebraic closure, with probability 1 we get an MRD code and it is
not a Gabidulin code. This suggest that if the field Fqm is large enough, then
generating X randomly should produce an MRD code which is not a Gabidulin
code.
2.4 Probability
In this section, we want to confirm the results from Section 2.3 by computing
some probability when we generate random linear rank metric code.
2.4.1 Probability for MRD codes
When generating random linear rank metric code, we want to know a bound on
the probability that the code is MRD.
Theorem 6. Let X ∈ Fk×(n−k)qm be randomly chosen. Then
Pr ([Ik|X] generates an MRD code) ≥ 1− k
∏k−1
i=0 (qn − qi)
qm
≥ 1− kqkn−m.
Proof. By Proposition 3, [Ik|X] generates a non-MRD code if and only if
f :=
∏
A∈Fn×kq
rankA=k
det([Ik|X]A) = 0.
We consider f as polynomial with variables as the entries of X which we denote
by x1, · · · , xk(n−k). Then det([Ik|X]A) is a polynomial of degree k at most.
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Moreover the number of matrices in Fn×kq with rank k is
∏k−1
i=0 (qn − qi) ≤ qkn.
Using Schwartz-Zippel lemma from Lemma 6, we get
Pr ([Ik|X] does not generate an MRD code) ≤ deg f
qm
.
Thus we get,
Pr ([Ik|X] generates an MRD code) ≥ 1− k
∏k−1
i=0 (qn − qi)
qm
≥ 1− kqkn−m.
To improve the previous bound, we we will use the set τ(k, n) given by
{E ∈ Fk×nq : E is in reduced row echelon form and rankE = k}.
We can reformulate Proposition 3 in the following way.
Proposition 4. LetG ∈ Fk×nqm be a generator matrix of a linear rank metric code.
Then C is an MRD code if and only if rank(EGT ) = k for all E ∈ τ(k, n).
Proof. This uses the fact that reducing a matrix to row echelon form is just
multiplying by invertible matrix which does not affect the rank of a matrix.
Following Proposition 4, we can replace the matrixA in the proof of Theorem
6 by matrices E ∈ τ(k, n). For E ∈ τ(k, n), let gE and h be the polynomials
gE(x1, · · · , xk(n−k)) := det([Ik|X]ET )
and
h(x1, · · · , xk(n−k)) := lcm{gE(x1, · · · , xk(n−k)) : E ∈ τ(k, n)}.
Proposition 5. The set of linear non-MRD codes of dimension k in Fnqm is in
one-to-one correspondence with the algebraic set
V ({h}) = {(v1, · · · , vk(n−k)) ∈ Fk(n−k)qm : h(v1, · · · , vk(n−k)) = 0}.
Proof. By Proposition 4, the set of linear non-MRD codes of dimension k in Fnqm
is in one-to-one correspondence with the algebraic set
V =
⋃
E∈τ(k,n)
{
(v1, · · · , vk(n−k)) ∈ Fk(n−k)qm : gE(v1, · · · , vk(n−k)) = 0}
}
=
(v1, · · · , vk(n−k)) ∈ Fk(n−k)qm : ∏
E∈τ(k,n)
gE(v1, · · · , vk(n−k)) = 0}

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=
{
(v1, · · · , vk(n−k)) ∈ Fk(n−k)qm : h(v1, · · · , vk(n−k)) = 0}
}
,
where the two last inequalities follow from the property of algebraic set that
V ({f}) ∪ V ({g}) = V ({fg}) = V ({lcm(f, g)})
Note that in the definition of an algebraic set, it suffices to use the square-free
part of the defining polynomial(s). In the above definition of V however, h is
already square-free, as we show in the following.
Lemma 8. For every E ∈ τ(k, n) the polynomial gE is square-free. In particular,
the polynomial h in Proposition 5 is square-free.
Proof. Since every variable x1 appears only in a unique row of [Ik|X]ET , the
degree with respect to every variable is at most 1. Therefore, gE cannot have
multiple factor.
Let us now look at an upper bound on the degree of the polynomial h.
Lemma 9. Let E ∈ τ(k, n) and let U be the subspace of Fnq defined by
U = {(u1, · · · , un) : uk+1 = · · · = un = 0}.
Then
deg gE = k − dim(rs(E) ∩ U),
where rs(E) is the row space of the matrix E.
Proof. Let r := k − dim(rs(E) ∩ U) with 0 ≤ r ≤ k. We can write
E :=
[
E1
E2
]
,
where E1 ∈ Fk×kq and E2 ∈ F(n−k)q ×k. Since dim(rs(E)∩U) = k− r, we have
rankE2 = r. Therefore, there exists a matrix M ∈ GLk(q) such that the first
r columns of E2M are linearly independent and the last k− r columns are zero.
Then
gE = det(Ik|X]ET ) = detM−1 det(E1M+XE2M).
The last k − r columns of the matrix XE2M are zero, i.e. the last k − r
columns of E1M+XE2M do not contain any of the variables xi. On the other
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hand, the entries of the first r columns are polynomials in Fq[x1, · · · , xk(n−k)] of
degree 1, since
E1M+XE2M =
(
n∑
l=1
(E1)ilMlj +
k∑
l=1
n∑
l′=1
Xil′(E2)ll′Mlj
)
ij
.
Hence we have deg gE ≤ r.
Now consider the matrix E2M. We can write
E2M = [E2|0]
where E2 is an (n− k)× r matrix of rank r. Hence
XE2M = [XE2|0].
Fix i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and denote by (XE2)i the i-th row of the matrix
XE2. The polynomials (XE2)ij, for j = 1, · · · , r, only involve the variables
x(i−1)(n−k)+1, · · · , xi(n−k). The Jacobian of these polynomials is ET2 , whose rows
are linearly independent over Fq. Therefore the elements in every row are alge-
braically independent over Fq ([Lef12], Chap. I). Moreover, different rows involve
different variables, hence we can conclude that the entries of the matrix XE2
are algebraically independent over Fq.
Now, let us look at the set of all r × r minors of XE2. These minors are all
different and hence linearly independent over Fq, otherwise a non-trivial linear
combination of them that give 0 would produce a non-trivial polynomial relation
between the entries of XE2. The degree r term of gE is a linear combination of
these minors. If we write
E1M = [∗|E1],
where E1 ∈ Fk×(k−r)q , then the coefficients of this linear combination are given by
the (k− r)× (k− r) minors of E1, multiplied by detM−1. Since ETM has rank
k and the last k − r columns of E2M are 0, it follows that the columns of E1
are linearly independent, and hence at least one of the coefficients of the linear
combination is non-zero. This proves that the degree r term of gE is non-zero,
and hence deg gE = r.
Using the previous results, we get the following theorem.
Theorem 7. Let X ∈ Fk×(n−k)qm be a random matrix. Then
Pr([Ik|X] generates an MRD code ) ≥ 1−
k∑
i=0
i
(
k
k − i
)
q
(
n− k
i
)
q
qi
2
q−m.
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Proof. For every i = 0, · · · , k, we define the set
τi = {E ∈ τ(k, n) : dim(U ∩ rs(E)) = k − i},
with
U := {(u1, · · · , un) ∈ Fnq : uk+1 = · · · = un = 0}.
By Lemma 2,
]τi =
(
k
k − i
)
q
(
n− k
i
)
q
qi
2
.
Furthermore, Lemma 9 says that if E ∈ τi, then deg gE = i. Hence, by the
definition of h(x1, · · · , xk(n−k)), we have
deg h ≤ ∑
E∈τ(k,n)
deg gE =
k∑
i=0
∑
E∈τ(k,n)
deg gE =
k∑
i=0
i
(
k
k − i
)
q
(
n− k
i
)
q
qi
2
.
Finally, we use the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma 6 to get the result.
Remark 5. If we set m < k(n − k) + logq k, then the lower bound of Theorem
7 is negative. In this regard, the bound is not tight. However Theorem 7 is an
improvement on the bound in Theorem 6.
2.4.2 Probability for Gabidulin codes
Using Lemma 7, the class of Gabidulin codes can be expressed as the union of
the set G(s), for 1 ≤ s ≤ m− 1 with
G(s) := {X ∈ (Fqm\Fq)k×(n−k) : rank(X[s] −X) = 1}.
A simple upper bound on the probability that a random linear code is a Gabidulin
code is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 10. Let X ∈ Fk×(n−k)qm be a random matrix. Then
Pr([Ik|X] generates a Gabidulin code) ≤
∑
0<s<m
gcd(s,m)=1
Pr(X ∈ G(s))
=
∑
0<s<m
gcd(s,m)=1
]G(s)
qmk(n−k)
.
We define the following map for any integer s with 1 ≤ s ≤ m − 1 with
gcd(s,m) = 1.
Φs : Fk×(n−k)qm → Fk×(n−k)qm
2.4. PROBABILITY 27
X 7→ X[s] −X.
For simplicity let
R1 :=
{
A ∈ Fk×(n−k)qm : rankA = 1
}
R1∗ :=
{
A ∈ (F∗qm)k×(n−k) : rankA = 1
}
K := (KerTr)k×(n−k)
Lemma 11.
(i) Given a matrix A ∈ Fk×(n−k)qm , there exists a matrix X ∈ Fk×(n−k)qm such that
Φs(X) = A if and only if A ∈ K.
(ii) If A ∈ R1, then
]Φ−1s (A) =
0 if A /∈ Kqn(n−k) if A ∈ K.
(iii) For every integer s coprime to m
G(s) = φ−1s (R1∗ ∩ K),
+ and
]G(s) = ]G(s) = qk(n−k)](R1∗ ∩ K).
Proof.
(i) This is a simple consequence of Lemma 2.
(ii) If A /∈ K, then the first part implies that Φ−1s (A) = ∅. Else, each entry
Ai,j is an element of Imφs. The converse is also true. Since φs is Fq-linear,
]φ−1s (Ai,j) = ]Kerφs. Now, using Lemma 2 again,
]Kerφs =
]Fqm
] Imφs
= q.
and A has k(n− k) entries, we get the result.
(iii) We have that
Φ−1s (R1) =
{
X ∈ Fk×(n−k)qm : rank(X[s] −X) = 1
}
and
Φ−1s
(
(F∗qm)
k×(n−k)) = (Fqm\Fq)k×(n−k).
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Since R1∗ = R1 ∩ (F∗qm)k×(n−k), then
Φ−1s (R1∗) = G(s).
We can partition
R1∗ = (R1∗ ∩ K) ∪ (R1∗ ∩ KC).
Using the first part, we get
G(s) = Φ−1s (R1∗) = Φ−1s (R1∗ ∩ K).
The second part completes the result.
We now give the following bound on the probability that a randomly generated
code is a Gabidulin code.
Theorem 8. Let X ∈ Fk×(n−k)qm be a random matrix. Denote by φ(m) the Euler
φ-function. Then
Pr([Ik|X] + generates a gen. Gabidulin code) ≤ φ(m)(2q1−m)b k2 cbn−k2 c.
Proof. From the third part of Lemma 11, we have that G(s) = G(1) for the
appropriate value of s. Now for any X ∈ (Fqm\Fq)k×(n−k), the rank of Xq −X
is larger than zero. Thus, we have
G(1) =
{
X ∈ (Fqm\Fq)k×(n−k) : rank(Xq −X) ≤ 1
}
.
Since “rank(Xq −X) ≤ 1” is equivalent to “any (2 × 2)-minor of Xq −X is
zero”, then a necessary condition is that any set of non-intersecting minors is
zero. We have bk2cbn−k2 c many such non-intersecting minors, each of which has
degree at most 2q if we see the entries of X as the variables x1, · · · , xk(n− k).
With Lemma 6, we get for each minor Mij,
Pr(Mi,j = 0) ≤ 2q1−m.
Since the non-intersecting minors are independent events, the probability that all
of these are zero is at most
(2q1−m)b k2 cbn−k2 c.
The statement follows from Lemma 10.
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We also want to improve this bound as we did in the previous section.
Lemma 12. Let Ta(x) = Tr(ax) for a ∈ Fqm . The set R1∗∩K is in one-to-one
correspondence with the set
VR :=
{
(α, β) ∈ Fkqm × Fn−k−1qm : αi, αiβi ∈ KerTr\{0}
}
=
{
(α, β) ∈ Fkqm × Fn−k−1qm : αi ∈ KerTr\{0}, βi ∈
k⋂
i=1
KerTαi\{0}
}
via the map ψ : VR → R1∗ ∩ K, given by
(α, β) 7→

α1
...
αk
(1, β1, . . . , βn−k−1) ,
and hence
](R1∗ ∩ K) ≤ (qm−1 − 1)n−1.
Proof. The map ψ is well defined and it is trivial to show that it is a bijection.
Now we have qm−1 − 1 choices for each αi. For the βi we cannot have more
than ]KerTα1\{0} = qm−1 − 1 choices. Therefore, in total, there can be at
most (qm−1 − 1)n−1 elements in VR.
We now have the following theorem.
Theorem 9. Let X ∈ Fk×(n−k)qm be randomly chosen. Then
Pr([Ik|X] generates a gen. Gabidulin code) ≤ φ(m)q−(m−1)(n−k−1)(k−1),
Proof. We use Lemmas 10, 11 part 3 and 12 to get the result.
2.4.3 Existence of non-Gabidulin MRD codes
Let Q(k) be the function on N given by
Q(k) =
k∏
i=1
(
1− 12i
)
.
Lemma 13. (Q(k))k∈N is a decreasing positive sequence converging to C '
0.2887. In particular Q(k) > 14 .
Proof. The approximation of the limit is found in [S+03].
30 CHAPTER 2. CLASSES OF MRD CODES
Lemma 14. Let j, k be two positive integers with 0 < k ≤ j. Then(
j
k
)
q
≤ 1
Q(k)q
k(j−k).
Proof. (
j
k
)
q
=
k−1∏
i=0
qj−i − 1
qk−i − 1 ≤
k−1∏
i=0
qj−i
qk−i −
(
q
2
)k−i = 1Q(k)qk(j−k).
Theorem 10. Let q be a prime power and let k and n be two integers such
that 1 < k < n − 1. If m ≥ k(n − k) + dlogq(4k + 1)e, then there exists a
k-dimensional linear MRD code in Fnqm that is not a generalized Gabidulin code.
Proof. We will prove the statement for n ≥ 2k. The other cases are proved just
by using the dual code. Let
f(m) =
k∑
i=0
i
(
k
k − i
)
q
(
n− k
i
)
q
qi
2
q−m + (m− 1)q−(m−1)(n−k−1)(k−1).
We first need to show that f(m) < 1 for m ≥ k(n− k) + dlogq(4k + 1)e.
First suppose that n ≥ 5. We have
k∑
i=0
i
(
k
k − i
)
q
(
n− k
i
)
q
qi
2
q−m ≤ kq−m
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
q
(
n− k
i
)
q
qi
2
= k
(
n
k
)
q
q−m
< 4kqk(n−k)−m, (2.1)
where the last inequality follows from Lemmas 13 and 14. Furthermore,
(m− 1)q−(m−1)(n−k−1)(k−1) = q−(m−1)(n−k−1)(k−1)+logq(m−1). (2.2)
Since
n+ k2 + 1− kn ≤ 0⇔ n ≥ k
2 + 1
k − 1 ⇔ n ≥ k + 1 +
2
k − 1 ,
and this is satisfied when k ≤ n/2 and n ≥ 5, we have(
(1−m)(k(n− k)− n+ 1) + logq(m− 1)
)
− (k(n− k)−m)
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= m(n+ k2 − kn) + 1 + logq(m− 1)− n
≤ m(n+ k2 − kn+ 1)− n
≤ 0.
Together with Equations (2.1) and (2.2), this gives us
f(m) < 4kqk(n−k)−m + q−(m−1)(n−k−1)(k−1)+logq(m−1) ≤ (4k + 1)qk(n−k)−m.
So, we get that for m ≥ k(n − k) + dlogq(4k + 1)e, it holds that f(m) < 1
which means there exists a non-Gabidulin MRD code.
For n = 4. This implies that k = 2 and m ≥ 4 + dlog1 9e. For these fixed
values of k and n, we consider f(m) = g(q,m) as a function of q and m. Thus
g(q,m) = 2q
4 + q3 + 2q2 + q
qm
+ m− 1
qm−1
,
which is a decreasing function in both q and m. If we fix q, we have that
g
(
q, 4 + dlogq 9e
)
≥ g(q,m), for every m ≥ 4 + dlogq 9e. So we need to show
that g
(
q, 4 + dlogq 9e
)
< 1 for every prime power q. We have
g (q, 4 + dlog1 9e) =
2q4 + q3 + 2q2 + q
q4+dlogq 9e
+
3 + dlogq 9e
q3+dlogq 9e
≤ 2q
4 + q3 + 2q2 + q
9q4 +
3 + d2 logq 3e
9q3 =: K(q).
We can check that K(q) is a decreasing function in q. Thus,
g
(
q, 4 + dlogq 9e
)
≤ K(q) ≤ K(2) = 49 < 1.
So now, we have that f(m) < 1. From Theorem 7, we know that
Pr([Ik|X] generates an MRD code ) ≥ 1−
k∑
i=0
i
(
k
k − i
)
q
(
n− k
i
)
q
qi
2
q−m.
Thus
Pr([Ik|X] generates an MRD code ) ≥ 1− f(m) + (m− 1)q−(m−1)(n−k−1)(k−1).
Using the fact that f(m) < 1, we have
Pr([Ik|X] generates an MRD code ) > (m− 1)q−(m−1)(n−k−1)(k−1).
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Furthermore φ(m) ≤ m− 1. So using Theorem 9, we get
Pr([Ik|X] generates an MRD code )
>
Pr([Ik|X] generates a gen. Gabidulin code).
Therefore, we see that the proportion of MRD codes is larger than the proportion
of Gabidulin codes. In other words, some of the MRD codes are non-Gabidulin
codes.
2.5 Construction of Non-Gabidulin MRD codes
In this section, we will give a construction of Non-Gabidulin MRD codes when we
work in a large field. This further confirms the results of the previous sections.
To do that we need a generalization of the concept of a linearized polynomial.
2.5.1 Differential operators
In this section, all notions are defined with arbitrary characteristic unless otherwise
specified.
Definition 20 (Derivations). Let R be a ring. A derivation of R is a map
δ : R −→ R such that, for all x and y in R,
δ(x+ y) = δx+ δy, δ(ab) = δ(a)b+ aδ(b).
We usually write x′ = δx or δ(x) to avoid confusion.
For a non-negative integer n, the n-th successive derivation is denoted by δn
and we also write δnx = x(n). Notice that δ0 = Id.
Definition 21 (Differential ring). A differential ring is a tuple (R, δ) of a ring
R and a fixed derivation defined on it. If the derivation is understood, then
we simply denote the differential ring by R. If R is a field, then we call it a
differential field.
Definition 22. Let (R, δ) be a differential ring (resp. field). The set of elements
x of R such that δx = 0 form a subring (resp. subfield) of R and it is called the
ring (resp. field) of constants of (R, δ).
Definition 23 (Differential operators). Let (F, δ) be a differential field. A dif-
ferential operator with coefficients in F is a polynomial in δ , i.e. of the form,
L =
n∑
i=0
aiδ
i, n ∈ N, ai ∈ F.
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The set of differential operators form a non-commutative ring where the multipli-
cation is defined by δx = x′ + xδ. We denote it by F〈δ〉. In the above notation,
n is called the order of L and we write ordL = n.
It is well known that the ring of differential operators admits an analogue of
the Euclidean division and therefore we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6 ([MM09]). Let (F, δ) be a differential field. The ring F〈δ〉 admits
a left and a right division. In other words, for L1 and L2 in F〈δ〉, there are
Q,R,Q′,R′ ∈ F〈δ〉 such that,
L2 = QL1 +R and ordR ≤ ordL1
L2 = L1Q′ +R′ and ordR′ ≤ ordL1
The operators Q,R,Q′,R′ ∈ F〈δ〉 are unique.
A differential operator L ∈ F〈δ〉 defines a differential equation Ly = 0. If
y ∈ F satisfy such equation, then we say that y is a solution of the differential
equation. The set of solutions of such equations defines a subspace of F over
the field of constants of (F, δ).
Rational functions and Formal derivatives
From now on, everything will be in characteristic p, for a fixed prime p.
Let Fp be a finite field with p elements, p prime. The polynomial ring over
Fp is denoted by Fp[T ] and the field of rational functions over Fp is denoted by
Fp(T ). We can define a derivation on Fp[T ] by the following,
δ(a0 + a1T + · · ·+ anT n) = a1 + 2a2T + · · ·+ nanT n−1.
This derivation can be extended to Fp(T ) by the following formula.
Let P,Q ∈ Fp[T ], then
δ
(
P
Q
)
= P
′Q−Q′P
Q2
.
With this derivation, we have that the ring of constants of (Fp[T ], δ) is equal to
Fp[T p] and the field of constants of (Fp(T ), δ) is equal to Fp(T p).
It is well known that the degree of the extension Fp(T )/Fp(T p) is equal to p.
From now on, everything will be as in the above example. Let K〈δ〉, be the
corresponding ring of differential operators, where K = Fp(T ).
Let Ly = 0 be a differential equation defined over K i.e L ∈ K〈δ〉. We have
seen above that the set of solution of such equation is a subspace of Fp(T ) as a
vector space over Fp(T p). One may ask what is the dimension of such solution
space. This is given by the following theorem.
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Proposition 7. Let (Fp(T ), δ) be a differential field with field of constants
Fp(T p) and let P1, · · · , Pn be n distinct elements of Fp(T ). Then, P1, · · · , Pm
are linearly independent over Fp(T p) if and only if the WronskianW is invertible,
with
Wm =

P1 P2 . . . Pm
δP1 δP2 . . . δPm
...
...
. . .
...
δm−1P1 δm−1P2 . . . δm−1Pm
 .
Proof. It is easy to see that if the Pi’s are linearly dependent over Fp(T p),
then the matrix W has linearly dependent columns and thus it is singular. We
will prove the converse by induction. The statement is obvious for m = 1.
Assume that P1, · · · , Pm−1 are linearly independent, and that the corresponding
Wronskian matrix Wm−1 is non-singular. Let Pm be a rational function which
is not in the vector space generated by P1, · · · , Pm−1 over Fp(T p). If Wm is
singular, then one of its columns is a linear combination of the other columns.
W.l.o.g. (assuming that αm = −1), we have that
δj(Pm) =
m−1∑
i=1
αiδ
j(Pi), 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1. (2.3)
Applying δ to Equation (2.3), we get that for 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 2,
δj+1(Pm) =
m−1∑
i=1
δ(αi)δj(Pi) + αiδj+1(Pi)
δj+1(Pm) =
m−1∑
i=1
αiδ
j+1(Pi).
Using these two equations, we get
0 =
m−1∑
i=1
δ(αi)δj(Pi), 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 2.
Since Wm−1 is non-singular, then δ(αi) = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1. Thus
αi ∈ Fp(T p). But, with j = 0 in Equation (2.3), we would get that Pm is
a linear combination of P1, · · · , Pm−1 over Fp(T p). Thus we get a contradiction.
Therefore Wm is also non-singular.
Recall that from Remark 1, even if we are working with infinite field, we can
still define the notion of maximum rank distance (MRD) code by the condition
k = n − d + 1, where k is the dimension of the linear code, n its length and d
its minimum distance.
The following theorem is an extension to infinite fields Proposition 3.
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Theorem 11. Let L andK be arbitrary fields (not necessarily finite) and suppose
that L/K is a field extension of finite degree. Let G ∈ Lk×n be the generator
matrix of a L-linear rank metric code C over the extension L/K. Then, C is a
maximum rank distance code if and only if for any (n× k)-matrix M over K of
rank k, GM is invertible.
Proof. Let C be a maximum rank distance [n, k, n− k + 1]-linear code. Let M
be an (n× k)-matrix M over K of rank k. If GM is not invertible, then there
is a vector x = (x1, · · · , xk) such that xGM = 0. We know that c = xG is a
codeword in C so that rank c ≥ n− k + 1.
Now, consider the K-linear map
φc : Kn → L
(m1, · · · ,mk) 7→ c(m1, · · · ,mk)T
It is easy to see that the rank of φc is equal to rank c. But we have that cM = 0
and M is of rank k, therefore the dimension of the kernel of φc is at least k. By
the rank nullity theorem, k ≤ n− rank c. Thus rank c ≤ n− k which gives a
contradiction. Therefore GM is invertible.
Conversely, suppose for any (n × k)-matrix M over K of rank k, GM is
invertible. We want to show that the code generated by G is a maximum rank
distance code. If not, then we have a codeword xG with rank weight at most
n − k. W.l.o.g we suppose that xG = (c1, · · · , cn−k, · · · , cn) with ci K-linear
combination of (c1, · · · , cn−k) for n − k < i ≤ n. Then we can find some
((n− k)× k)-matrix A such that
xG
[
A
Ik
]
= 0.
This is in contradiction with our hypothesis.
Using Proposition 7 and 11, we can construct an MRD code over the extension
Fp(T )/Fp(T p). For that we need the next theorem.
Theorem 12. Let (Fp(T ), δ) be a differential field with field of constants Fp(T p)
and let {P0, · · · , Pn−1} be a basis of the extension Fp(T )/Fp(T p), with n = p−1
and Pi = T i. Then the matrix G is a generator matrix of an MRD code over
Fp(T )/Fp(T p) with parameters [n, k], where
G =

P0 P1 . . . Pn−1
δP0 δP1 . . . δPn−1
...
...
. . .
...
δk−1P0 δk−1P1 . . . δk−1Pn−1
 .
36 CHAPTER 2. CLASSES OF MRD CODES
Proof. By using Theorem 11, it is enough to show that for any (n × k)-matrix
M over Fp(T p) of rank k, GM is invertible over Fp(T ). But we can easily
check that for any (n×k)-matrixM over Fp(T p) of rank k, GM is an invertible
Wronskian matrix by using Proposition 7.
We have now given a construction of MRD codes over the extension of finite
degree Fp(T )/Fp(T p). Of course this code is not really useful for application as
we have infinite symbols. However, in the following, we will show that we can
get an MRD code over finite fields from this code.
From Theorem 12, if we choose Pi = T i, then the matrix G is
G =

1 T T 2 T 3 · · · T k−1 · · · T p−1
0 1 2T 3T 2 · · · (k − 1)T k−2 · · · (p− 1)T p−2
0 0 2 6T · · · (k − 1)(k − 2)T k−3 · · · (p− 1)(p− 2)T p−3
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
0 0 0 0 · · · (k − 1)! . . . ∏k−1i=1 (p− i)T p−k
 (2.4)
Since for any (n × k)-matrix M over Fp(T p) of rank k, GM is invertible over
Fp(T ). In particular for any (n×k)-matrixM over Fp of rank k,GM is invertible
over Fp(T ). The entries of GM have the following property: the entries in the
i-th row are polynomial of degree p− i.
Theorem 13. Let G be the matrix defined in Equation (2.4). If Q is an irre-
ducible polynomial Fp[T ] such that degQ = r = pk − k(k+1)2 + 1. Then taking
G = G mod Q (meaning that all entries are taken modulo Q). The linear
code over the extension Fpr/Fp with generator matrix G is an MRD code of
parameters [p, k].
Proof. We have seen that for any (n× k)-matrix M over Fp of rank k, GM is
invertible over Fp(T ). Therefore the determinants of these matrices are non-zero
polynomials in T of degree pk − k(k+1)2 at most. By the choice of Q, these
polynomials when reduced modulo Q gives non-zero elements of Fpr . Thus by
applying Theorem 11 on G over the field extension Fpr/Fp, we get an MRD
code.
We have thus constructed a maximum rank distance code over the field
extension Fpr/Fp with parameters [p, k]. For us to construct an MRD code of
length p we need and extension of degree r = pk− k(k+1)2 +1. This is too large for
practical consideration. However, the point here is to show that we can construct
MRD codes when the field extension is large. By using the Gabidulin criterion
from Theorem 3, it is not hard to produce an example of our construction and
show that it is not a Gabidulin code by using a computer.
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Remark 6. In fact, we do not necessarily need to choose r = pk − k(k+1)2 + 1.
We can just choose a smaller degree polynomial Q such that all the determinant
of the maximal submatrices modulo Q are still non-zero. We can also restrict
the choice of matrices in Theorem 11 to the matrices in reduce column echelon
form.
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Chapter 3
Decoding algorithms for rank
metric codes
The second section of this Chapter is based on a work together with Joachim
Rosenthal [RR17]. The third section is is based on my work [Ran17].
3.1 Twisted Gabidulin codes
Let Fqm/Fq be a finite field extension of degree m. Let n ≤ m be a positive
integer. All linear codes considered in this section are of length n.
As we have seen before, the key of the construction of Gabidulin codes is
that we use linearized polynomials of degree qk−1 at most so that the polynomial
can have qk−1 zeroes at most. However, we still can bound the number of roots
of the polynomial even if we take polynomials of larger degree, namely qk. For
that we have the following proposition.
Proposition 8. Let f(x) = f0x+ f1xq + · · ·+ fkxqk ∈ Lq,m[x] be a linearized
polynomial over Fqm . If f(x) has a kernel of dimension k as an Fq-linear map
on Fqm , then there is a non-zero z ∈ Fqm such that f0z = (−1)kf qkzq.
Proof. Suppose that the kernel V of f has dimension k. Let x0, · · · , xk−1 be a
basis of the kernel of f . We define the linearized polynomial h(x) = ∑i hixqi by
h(x) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x xq . . . xq
k
x0 x
q
0 . . . x
qk
0
...
...
. . .
...
xk−1 x
q
k−1 . . . x
qk
k−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
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It is obvious that h(x) also vanishes on V . Therefore, we have that hi = fiz for
some non-zero z ∈ Fqm . Furthermore, by computing the above determinant, we
have h0 = (−1)khqk. The result follows.
Now we can construct the new class of MRD codes from [She16].
Definition 24. Let n, k, r,m be integers and suppose that m > k, n > 0. Let
{a1, · · · , an} be n distinct element of Fqm linearly independent over Fq. We
define the set
G(η, r) = {f0x+ f1xq + · · ·+ fk−1xqk−1 + ηf qr0 xqk : fi ∈ Fqm}.
Let qev be the evaluation map defined in Example 2. If N(η) 6= (−1)kn, then
C(η, r) = qev(G(η, r)) is an MRD code called a twisted Gabidulin code.
To see that this defines an MRD code, first we use the fact that the dimension
of the kernel is at most k. But it cannot be k, by the choice of η and by using
Theorem 8. And finally, as in the case of Gabidulin codes, we use the rank nullity
theorem to complete the result.
Remark 7.
(i) The original Gabidulin codes corresponds to the case where η = 0.
(ii) When r 6= 0, then we have an MRD code which is linear only over Fq.
(iii) This construction can be generalized by replacing the Frobenius map xq by
xq
s with gcd(m, s) = 1.
It was shown in [She16] that the class of twisted Gabidulin codes contains
codes which are not equivalent to any generalized Gabidulin code.
In Chapter 1, we mentioned that the set of linearized polynomials Lq,m[x] is
a polynomial ring when we take the product between two linearized polynomials
as their composition. Namely (Lq,m[x],+, ◦) is a non commutative ring with +
being the usual addition of two polynomials and
axq
i ◦ bxqj = abqixqi+j , i, j ∈ N and a, b ∈ Fqm .
The ring of linearized polynomials was studied by Ore in [Ore33]. It admits a
left/right Euclidean division and this division will later be used in the decoding
algorithm.
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3.2 A Kötter-Kschischang-like decoding algo-
rithm for twisted Gabidulin codes
Rank metric codes have application in network coding. In [KK08], a construction
of subspace code, which is used in random network coding, was presented. It
is similar to Gabidulin codes as the construction also involves evaluations of
linearized polynomial. A decoding algorithm for the constructed subspace code
was presented. That algorithm can be easily modified to decode Gabidulin codes.
Here we want to modify the algorithm to apply it to the decoding of some
particular cases of twisted Gabidulin codes.
Let f ∈ G(η, r) be the message polynomial. It is encoded into the codeword
(f(α1), f(α2), · · · , f(αn)) .
This codeword is sent and we assume that the word (r1, r2, · · · , rn) was
received. We define the error vector
e = (f(α1)− r1, f(α2)− r2, · · · , f(αn)− rn)
Under the assumption t < n−k+12 rank errors happened, we seek the unique
codeword (f(α1), f(α2), · · · , f(αn)) , f ∈ G(η, r) such that e has rank weight t.
e = (e1, · · · , en) now defines an Fq-endomorphism
Fnq −→ Fqm
(b1, · · · , bn) 7−→
∑
i
biei.
By the definition of rank, we see that the rank of this map is rank(e). Therefore,
by the rank nullity theorem, the kernel V of this map is a subspace of dimension
n− t.
We have
V =
{
(b1, · · · , bn) :
∑
i
bif(αi) =
∑
i
biri
}
. (3.1)
Assume that we have two linearized polynomials P1 and P2, with degree at
most qn−t and qn−t−k respectively. Assume furthermore that P1 and P2 satisfy
P1(αi)− P2(ri) = 0 ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (3.2)
Choose (b1, · · · , bn) ∈ V , we thus have that
P1(
∑
i
biαi)− P2(
∑
i
biri)
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=P1(
∑
i
biαi)− P2(
∑
i
bif(αi))
=P1(
∑
i
biαi)− P2(f(
∑
i
biαi)).
Therefore P1 − P2 ◦ f vanishes on a subspace W ' V of dimension n− t.
First, assume that P1 and P2 are of the form
P1(x) = a0x+ a1xq + · · ·+ an−t−1xqn−t−1 + an−txqn−t .
P2(x) = b0x+ b1xq + · · ·+ bn−t−kxqn−t−k .
and of course
f(x) = f0x+ f1xq + · · ·+ fk−1xqk−1 + ηf qr0 xqk .
With these forms, we see that P1 − P2 ◦ f is of degree qn−t at most where
the two extreme monomials are
A = (a0 − b0f0)x,
and
B =
(
an−t − bn−t−kηqn−t−kf qr+n−t−k0
)
xq
n−t
.
Now we are ready to explain the decoding algorithm. First, we want to solve
the system of linear equations (3.2). This is a system of n independent equations
at most. We have 2n − 2t − k + 2 unknown. Since we consider that the error
has rank, t < n−k+12 , then we see that, the system (3.2) is underdetermined.
Namely the solution space of this system of equation is of dimension 2 at least.
This can be solved in polynomial time using the Gaussian elimination.
As we have seen, we now have two polynomials P1(x) and P2(x) such that
(P1−P2 ◦f) is of q-degree n− t but also has n− t zeros. If one of a0− b0f0 and
an−t− bn−t−kηqn−t−kf qr+n−t−k0 is equal to 0, then we must have P1−P2 ◦ f = 0
as polynomial. Therefore, we have two possibilities. In the first case we use a
division algorithm to recover the polynomial f by computing P1/P2. Notice that
the division is done in the linearized polynomial ring. If that does not work, then
the second possibility is that as in the proof of Proposition 8, we must have a
polynomial h(x) = h0x+ · · ·+ hn−txqn−t such that h and P1 − P2 ◦ f have the
same zeroes with
h0 = (−1)n−thqn−t,
and
hn−t = (−1)n−t
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x0 x
q
0 · · · xq
n−t−1
0
x1 x
q
1 · · · xq
n−t−1
1
...
...
. . .
...
xn−t−1 x
q
n−t−1 · · · xq
n−t−1
n−t−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
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Now the polynomial P1 − P2 ◦ f and h differ only by a constant multiple so
that, for any solution {ai, bi} of the system of equations (3.2)
h0
hn−t
= a0 − b0f0
an−t − bn−t−kηqn−t−kf qr+n−t−k0
. (3.3)
So we will use the above relation to compute f0 and we will thus get
(g(αq1)− r1, g(αq2)− r2, · · · , g(αqn)− rn) .
where
g(x) = f1x+ · · ·+ fk−1xqk−2
Finally, a decoding algorithm of Gabidulin codes allows us to recover ri and thus
we can recover the original message.
So, what remains is how do we find f0 from the relation (3.3). Suppose
we have two linearly independent solutions {ai, bi} and {a′i, b′i} of the Equation
(3.2). Then they form two polynomials with the same roots as h(x). Thus
a0 − b0f0
an−t − bn−t−kηqn−t−kf qr+n−t−k0
= a
′
0 − b′0f0
a′n−t − b′n−t−kηqn−t−kf q
r+n−t−k
0
.
In some case, we can solve this to recover f0. For example, if r + n = t + k
mod m, then, since xqm = x, this becomes a polynomial equation of degree two.
This can be easily solved and we try out the two values of f0 for decoding. This
condition is needed here as the above equation cannot be simply solved when
the degree is large. Moreover, in that case there may be many possibilities for
the solution f0 of the equations and this will render the algorithm impracticable.
We summarize the decoding algorithm in the following. We suppose that
r + n = t+ k mod m. And the message polynomial is
f(x) = f0x+ f1xq + · · ·+ fk−1xqk−1 + ηf qr0 xqk .
Algorithm
We are given a received codeword (r1, · · · , rn).
(I) Solve the system of linear equations in the variables bj and aj,
P1(αi)− P2(ri) = 0, ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
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where
P1(x) = a0x+ · · ·+ an−txqn−t ,
and
P2(x) = b0x+ · · ·+ bn−t−kxqn−t−k .
Get two linearly independent solutions {ai, bi}, {a′i, b′i}.
(II) For the above solutions, compute P1/P2 as a polynomial division in the
linearized polynomial ring. One can easily check if the quotient is the
original message by comparing its rank distance to the received codeword.
(III) If the previous step does not give the original message, then solve for f0
in the equation
a0 − b0f0
an−t − bn−t−kηqn−t−kf0 =
a′0 − b′0f0
a′n−t − b′n−t−kηqn−t−kf0
This is equivalent to a polynomial equation of degree 2.
(IV) We now recover f0, and remove the contribution of f0x + ηf q
r
0 x
qk from
the received word. Any decoding algorithm of Gabidulin codes can now be
used to recover
g(x) = f1x+ · · ·+ fk−1xqk−2
For the complexity, we give a brief explanation of why it is polynomial. Step
I is solving a system of linear equations and thus it can be done in polynomial
time. In fact finding two linearly independent solutions can be done in O(n3)
field operations. For Step II, the polynomial division in the linearized polynomial
ring as it was described in [KK08] can also be done in polynomial time. This is
O(n2) . For Step III, solving a polynomial system of degree 2 is easy. Finally,
for Step IV, we just need to use any existing decoding algorithm of Gabidulin
codes. There are plenty of those and they can be executed in polynomial time
[Loi06, RP04]. To conclude, this decoding algorithm is dominated by the first
step and thus the overal complexity if O(n3) field operations. If one uses the the
Interpolate procedure in [KK08], the overall complexity can even be reduced to
O(n2) field operations.
Remark 8. We have considered only the case where the code is the original
Gabidulin code. The algorithm can be easily modified for any type of generalized
Gabidulin code where we use xqsi instead of xqi .
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3.3 A New decoding algorithm for MRD codes
Most of the decoding algorithms for Gabidulin codes are using syndrome com-
putation, extended Euclidean algorithm, Berlekamp-Massey algorithm. In this
section, we will use the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm for a rank metric code
again, but in a different way. First, we give the new decoding algorithm for
Gabidulin codes. Then we will show how to modify the algorithm to get it to
work with general twisted Gabidulin code. In this section we will only work with
rank metric code of full length i.e. a linear code in (Fqn)n. The rank of a lin-
earized polynomial is the rank of the polynomial as an Fq-linear map Fqn → Fqn .
For reference, let us first show a brief description of some known decoding
algorithm so that we can see the difference between them and our new algorithm.
Suppose that r is the received vector.
(1) Compute the syndrome vector rHT , where H is a parity check matrix of the
code given by hi,j = hq
i
j . The entries si of this vector define a linearized
polynomial S(x).
(2) Determine two linearized polynomials L(x) and F (x) such that F (x) =
L(x) ◦ S(x) mod xqd−1 . Here, there are two methods: Use Berlekamp
Massey [RP04] or use the extended Euclidean algorithm [Gab85].
(3) Find a basis {ei} of the kernel of L(x).
(4) Compute the αi’s from
∑
i eiα
qj
i = sj.
(5) Find a matrix Y, with αj =
∑
iYj,ihi.
(6) Finally the error vector is eY , where the entries of e are ei.
(7) output the message as r− e.
3.3.1 Decoding algorithm for Gabidulin codes
Let us first look at some properties of linearized polynomials. Using Lemma 1,
we get the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Let λ be an element of Fqn and let λFq be the Fq-subspace of
Fqn generated by λ. Then any linear map Fqn → λFq has the form λTr(ax) for
some a ∈ Fqn .
The above representation in the proposition is of course not unique. As a
consequence of the previous proposition, we have the following theorem. This
theorem appears already in [LQ12] but here, we give a different proof.
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Theorem 14. Let f be a linearized polynomial of rank r, then there are two
subsets of Fqn S1 = {a1, · · · , ar} and S2 = {b1, · · · , br} such that they are both
linearly independent over Fq and that
f(x) = a1Tr(b1x) + · · · arTr(brx).
Proof. Since f is of rank r, then we choose {a1, · · · , ar} to be a generator of
the image of f as a linear map. By Proposition 9, each projection of f onto the
subspace aiFq = 〈ai〉 has the form aiTr(bix). Thus we get the desired form of
f . What remains to be shown is the linear independence of the bi’s. Without
loss of generality, say b1 = m2b2 + · · ·+mrbr, with mi ∈ Fq. Then
f(x) = a1 ((Tr((m2b2 + · · ·+mrbr)x))) + a2Tr(b2x) + · · ·+ arTr(brx)
= a1Tr(m2b2x) + · · ·+ a1Tr(mrbrx) + a2Tr(b2x) + · · ·+ arTr(brx)
= (a2 + a1m2)Tr(b2x) + · · ·+ (ar + a1mr)Tr(brx).
Thus rank of f is at most r − 1 which is a contradiction.
From Theorem 14, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let f(x) be a linearized polynomial of rank r over the field extension
Fqn/Fq such that
f(x) = f0x+ f1xq + · · ·+ fn−1xqn−1 .
Then there are two subsets of Fqn S1 = {a1, · · · , ar} and S2 = {b1, · · · , br}
such that they are both linearly independent over Fq, and for all integer i such
that 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1,
fi =
r∑
j=1
bq
i
j aj.
Definition 25. Let f(x) = f0x + f1xq + · · · + fn−1xqn−1 be a linearized poly-
nomial. The Dickson matrix associated to f(x) is the matrix
M =

f0 f
q
n−1 . . . f
qn−1
1
f1 f
q
0 . . . f
qn−1
2
...
...
. . .
...
fn−1 f
q
n−2 . . . f
qn−1
0
 .
Recall that given {a1, · · · , ak} ⊂ Fqn , the Moore matrix associated to the
ai’s is the matrix 
a1 a2 . . . ak
aq1 a
q
2 . . . a
q
k
...
...
. . .
...
aq
k−1
1 a
qk−1
2 . . . a
qk−1
k

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It is well known that the above Moore matrix is invertible if and only if the ai’s
are linearly independent over Fq.
As a consequence of Corollary 1, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 15. Let f(x) be a linearized polynomial of rank r over the field ex-
tension Fqn/Fq such that
f(x) = f0x+ f1xq + · · ·+ fn−1xqn−1 .
Let M1, · · · ,Mn be the rows of the matrix M as in Definition 25.
Then we have the following property:
(i) The matrix M is of rank r.
(ii) Any r successive rowsMi, · · · ,Mi+r are linearly independent and the other
rows are linear combinations of them.
(iii) All (r×r)-matrices (Mi,j)(i mod n,j mod n) ; l1 ≤ i ≤ l1+r, l2 ≤ j ≤ l2+r
with 0 ≤ li ≤ n− 1 are invertible.
Proof. From Corollary 1, one sees that M = BA, where
B =

b1 b2 . . . br
bq1 b
q
2 . . . b
q
r
...
...
. . .
...
bq
n−1
1 b
qn−1
2 . . . b
qn−1
r
 and A =

a1 a
q
1 . . . a
qn−1
1
a2 a
q
2 . . . a
qn−1
2
...
...
. . .
...
ar a
q
r . . . a
qn−1
r

Since the ai’s are linearly independent over Fq and the same for the b′is, we see
that each r successive rows of B and any r successive columns of A constitute
invertible matrices. All statements of the theorem follow from these facts.
This theorem is important to us. It enables us to build a new decoding
algorithm.
We are now ready to explain the decoding algorithm. It consists of two
steps. The first part is to interpolate the received message to construct the
polynomial f(x) + g(x), where f(x) is the message polynomial and g(x) is the
error polynomial. Since f(x) is of degree qk−1 at most, we should know the
coefficient of xqi in g(x), ∀i ≥ k. We will show that these coefficients are
enough to recover the whole polynomial g(x) with some condition on the rank
of g(x).
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3.3.1.1 Polynomial interpolation
First of all, we need to do some interpolation to get a linearized polynomial form.
Recall that the encoding was just the evaluation
qev : Lq,n[x]→ (Fqn)n
f(x) 7→ (c1, c2, · · · , cn),
where ci = f(ai) and {a1, a2, · · · , an} is a fixed basis of Fqn/Fq.
We assume that an error e = (e1, e2, · · · , en) was added to the original
codeword and suppose that rank(e) = t < n−k+12 . Therefore (r1, r2, · · · , rn)
was received with ri = ci + ei.
Let U be the Moore matrix
U =

a1 a
q
1 . . . a
qn−1
1
a2 a
q
2 . . . a
qn−1
2
...
...
. . .
...
an a
q
n . . . a
qn−1
n

Then
U

f0 + g0
...
fn−1 + gn−1
 =

r1
...
rn

where g(x) = ∑ gixqi is the error polynomial corresponding to e i.e. g(ai) = ei.
Obviously, g(x) as an Fq-linear map has rank t < n−k+12 .
Thus, we may compute U−1 in advance and then compute
U−1

r1
...
rn
 .
This gives us f0 + g0, · · · , fn−1 + gn−1. Since fi = 0,∀i ≥ k, we now know the
values of gk, · · · gn−1. In the next step, we will use these coefficients to recover
the other coefficients of g(x).
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3.3.1.2 Polynomial reconstruction
Let us have a look at the matrix M in Theorem 15 corresponding to the error
polynomial g(x). We consider its submatrix
W =

g0 g
q
n−1 . . . g
qn−(k+t−1)
k+t−1 . . . g
qn−k
k . . . g
qn−1
1
g1 g
q
0 . . . g
qn−(k+t−1)
k+t . . . g
qn−k
k+1 . . . g
qn−1
2
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
gt−1 g
q
t−2 . . . g
qn−(k+t−1)
k+2t−2 . . . g
qn−k
k+t−1 . . . g
qn−1
t
gt g
q
t−1 . . . g
qn−(k+t−1)
k+2t−1 . . . g
qn−k
k+t . . . g
qn−1
t+1

.
We know that the t last rows are linearly independent and that the first row
should be a linear combination of the t last rows.
This gives us an equation of the form
(λ0, · · · , λt)

gq
n−(k+t−1)
k+t−1 . . . g
qn−k
k
gq
n−(k+t−1)
k+t . . . g
qn−k
k+1
...
. . .
...
gq
n−(k+t−1)
k+2t−2 . . . g
qn−k
k+t−1
gq
n−(k+t−1)
k+2t−1 . . . g
qn−k
k+t

= 0 (3.4)
where we may assume that λ0 = 1.
After interpolation we know the coefficients gk, · · · , gn−1. Since we suppose
that t < n−k+12 , then k + 2t − 1 ≤ n − 1. Thus we know all the coefficients
gk, · · · , gk+2t−1. And thus, by Theorem 15, this equation has unique solution in
λ which we can compute. This can be done for example by using matrix inversion
but that will take O(t3) operations.
Similarly to the case of Reed-Solomon codes, we can do better. Namely, we
have here a Toeplitz-like matrix. And this can be solved by using a Berlekamp-
Massey-like algorithm from [RP04]. To see this let ui = gq
n−i
i . Therefore,
Equation (3.4) becomes.The algorithm was first discovered in [PT91] and then
rediscovered in [RP04] without proof. For a proof, one can have a look at
[VGM11].
(λ0, · · · , λt)

uk+t−1 . . . uk
uqk+t . . . u
q
k+1
...
. . .
...
uq
t−1
k+2t−2 . . . u
qt−1
k+t−1
uq
t
k+2t−1 . . . u
qt
k+t

= 0 (3.5)
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We want to solve Equation (3.5) i.e. we want to find λ1, · · · , λt from the
sequence (uk+2t−1, · · · , uk+t, · · · , uk). Equation (3.5) is exactly the form of
recurrence shown in [RP04]. In that paper, they gave an algorithm for solving
Equation (3.5). We will give the algorithm in Algorithm 1. We set d = n−k+1.
Algorithm 1 Berlekamp-Massey
1: procedure BERLEKAMP-MASSEY(s0, · · · , s2t−1)
2: L← 0
3: Λ(0)(x)← x
4: B(0)(x)← x
5: i← 0
6: while i ≤ d− 2 do
7: ∆i ← si +∑Lj=1 λ(i)j sqji−j
8: Λ(i+1) ← Λ(i) −∆ixq ◦B(i)(x)
9: if ∆i == 0 then
10: B(i+1)(x)← xq ◦B(i)(x)
11: else
12: if 2L > i then
13: B(i+1)(x)← xq ◦B(i)(x)
14: else
15: B(i+1)(x)← ∆−1i Λ(i)(x)
16: L← i+ 1− L
17: end if
18: end if
19: i← i+ 1
20: end while
21: return Λ(i)(x)
22: end procedure
In this algorithm Λ(i)(x) = ∑j λ(i)j xqj and at the end of the algorithm, we
will just collect the coefficient of the Λ(i)(x) to get our λi. Notice that on input
we take (s0, · · · , s2t−1) = (uk+2t−1, · · · , uk).
We summarize our decoding algorithm with the following steps in Algorithm
2. Suppose (r1, r2, · · · , rn) was received with an error of rank t < n−k+12 . We
already know the matrix U−1 in advance.
Remark 9. The Step (3) in Algorithm 2 is similar to some step of a decoding
algorithm of some classes of linear Hamming metric codes presented in [Bla79].
The step is called Syndrome extension while the whole algorithm is called Trans-
form domain decoding. Transform domain decoding was extended to rank metric
in [LSS14]. However, our algorithm as a whole is different as we use interpolation
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Algorithm 2 Decoding algorithm
Input: (r1, · · · , rn)
(1) Compute 
f0 + g0
...
fk−1 + gk−1
gk
...
gn−1

= U−1

r1
...
rn

(2) Use the Berlekamp-Massey-like Algorithm 1 to get the λi’s.
(3) Use the fact that the first row of the matrix W is a linear combination of
the remaining rows, using the λi’s, to recursively compute the remaining
coefficients of g(x). This is just like recursively computing elements of a
sequence but the difference with linear-feedback shift register is that the
steps also involves raising to some power of q.
(4) Output the message as (f + g)(x)− g(x).
instead of syndrome computation in the first step.
3.3.1.3 Complexity and comparison with other algorithms
All the three first steps of Algorithm 2 have quadratic complexity i.e they can
be done in O(n2) operations in Fqn . The last step is a linear operation. Thus in
general we have an algorithm with O(n2) operations in Fqn .
We already saw two decoding algorithms at the beginning of Section 3.3. As
we can see, there is a difference in the first steps of these algorithms and our
algorithm. Instead of using an ((n−k)×n) matrix for computing the syndromes,
we use an (n×n) matrix to interpolate f +g. So in the first step, we have some
O(nk) extra multiplications. The second steps are more or less the same as they
are either Berlekamp-Massey or extended Euclidean algorithm. The last steps are
where we may get the advantage as we directly use a linear recurrence to recover
the error polynomial. For the other algorithms at the beginning of this Section
3.3, one first needs to compute the roots of some polynomials (error locator
polynomial) before one can reconstruct the error vectors using some relations.
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3.4 Extension to twisted Gabidulin codes
In this section, we will explain that our algorithm can also be modified to get a
decoding algorithm for twisted Gabidulin codes. And in contrast to the algorithm
in Section 3.2, we can do it for any parameters. We assume that the original
message was given by
f(x) = f0x+ · · ·+ fk−1xqk−1 + ηf qr0 xqk .
After the interpolation step, we get the polynomial f(x) + g(x). In opposite to
the case of Gabidulin codes, we do not know the value of gk from this. However
the problem we are faced remains similar. We want to find a linear relation
between the rows of
W =

g0 g
q
n−1 . . . g
qn−(k+t−1)
k+t−1 . . . g
qn−k
k . . . g
qn−1
1
g1 g
q
0 . . . g
qn−(k+t−1)
k+t . . . g
qn−k
k+1 . . . g
qn−1
2
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
gt−1 g
q
t−2 . . . g
qn−(k+t−1)
k+2t−2 . . . g
qn−k
k+t−1 . . . g
qn−1
t
gt g
q
t−1 . . . g
qn−(k+t−1)
k+2t−1 . . . g
qn−k
k+t . . . g
qn−1
t+1

.
where we know the values gk+1, · · · , gn−1 and ηgqr0 − gqk . We will see that we
still can solve this problem. We have an equation of the form
(λ0, · · · , λt)

gq
n−(k+t)
k+t g
qn−(k+t−1)
k+t−1 . . . g
qn−k
k
gq
n−(k+t)
k+t+1 g
qn−(k+t−1)
k+t . . . g
qn−k
k+1
...
. . .
. . .
...
gq
n−(k+t)
k+2t−1 g
qn−(k+t−1)
k+2t−2 . . . g
qn−k
k+t−1
gq
n−(k+t−1)
k+2t g
qn−(k+t−1)
k+2t−1 . . . g
qn−k
k+t

= 0.
Notice that we introduce one more column in the equation. Again, by as-
sumption, we have 2t < n − k + 1. Thus k + 2t ≤ n. If k + 2t < n, then
a Berlekamp-Massey algorithm using the columns of the previous matrix except
the last column is enough to compute the λi’s. If k+ 2t = n, then the equation
becomes,
(λ0, · · · , λt)

gq
n−(k+t)
k+t g
qn−(k+t−1)
k+t−1 . . . g
qn−k
k
gq
n−(k+t)
k+t+1 g
qn−(k+t−1)
k+t . . . g
qn−k
k+1
...
. . .
. . .
...
gq
n−(k+t)
n−1 g
qn−(k+t−1)
n−2 . . . g
qn−k
k+t−1
gq
n−(k+t)
0 g
qn−(k+t−1)
n−1 . . . g
qn−k
k+t

= 0, (3.6)
3.4. EXTENSION TO TWISTED GABIDULIN CODES 53
where two entries in terms of gk and g0 are unknown.
If we use the columns of the matrix except the first and last columns, then we
should have an underdetermined system of linear equations whose solution space
is of dimension two. We assume that two linearly independent solutions are λ and
λ′. They can be found using the Berlekamp-Massey like algorithm again. Thus
a solution of equation (3.6) is of the form λ+Aλ′ for some A ∈ Fqn . Using this
with the first column and the last column, we get two equations. Furthermore,
we also know ηgqr0 − gk. So in total we get a system of three equations with
three unknowns, 
h0 + h1A+ (h2 + h3A)gq
n−(k+t)
0 = 0
h4 + h5A+ (h6 + h7A)gq
n−k
k = 0
h8 + ηgq
r
0 − gk = 0
. (3.7)
In this system, we know all the hi and the variables g0, gk, A are unknown. Notice
that any solution of the system of Equation (3.7) is a solution of the decoding
algorithm. By the unique decoding property, there can only be one solution of
this system.
To solve the system, we use the third equation in the two first equations and
we get  s0 + s1A+ (s2 + s3A)g
qi
0 = 0
s4 + s5A+ (s6 + s7A)gq
j
0 = 0
(3.8)
with the si’s known. If s2 + s3A = 0 or s6 + s7A = 0, then we can use this to
get the value of A. Else the first equation in Equation (3.8) gives us
gq
i
0 =
s0 + s1A
s2 + s3A
And using this with the second equation in Equation (3.8), we get a one variable
equation of the form, for some integer l,
s0 + s1A
s2 + s3A
= s
′
4 + s′5Aq
l
s′6 + s′7Aql
.
We want to point out that this form of equation was also obtained in Section
3.2. However, in the case here, we are sure that any solution would give us the
closest codeword to the received message. We have now reduced the problem to
solving the polynomial equation of the form
P (A) = u0 + u1A+ u2Aq
l + Aql+1 = 0.
We distinguish three cases:
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(I) If u0 = u1u2, then we can factor P (A) = (Aq
l + u1)(A+ u2).
(II) If u1 = uq2, then
P (A) = u0 + uq
l
2 A+ u2Aq
l + Aql+1
= u0 − uql2 u2 + (A+ u2)ql+1
(III) If u0 6= u1u2 and u1 6= uq2, then, from [Blu04], by a change of variable
y = (u2u1 − u0)(u1 − uql2 )−1A− u2, we will get a polynomial equation of
the form
Q(y) = yql+1 − vy + v = 0
with v = (u1 − uql2 )ql+1/(u0 − u2u1)ql .
First of all, it is easy to show that if we get A from P (A), then we can use
Equation (3.8) to get g0. And we use Equation (3.7) to get gk. These will give
us the error polynomial g(x) with the recurrence relation from Equation (3.6).
So, normally, there should be only one unique solution for A. Now the question is
how do we solve the equation P (A) = 0? Any of the three cases which produce
multiple solutions should be ruled out. The first case of P (A) is easy to solve.
The two last cases reduce to polynomials of the form
P (X) = Xql+1 + aX + b.
The number of roots of such polynomials was studied in [Blu04]. Here we will
give a method to find these roots.
Suppose that y2 is a root of P (X). Then set b = −yql+12 − ay2 and choose
y1 = −a− yql2 . thus b = y2y1. We get
(xql − y1x) ◦ (xql − y2x) = xq2l − yql2 xql − y1xql + y1y2x
= xq2l + axq + bx.
The converse is also true. So, to get the root of P (X), we just need to factor the
linearized polynomial xq2l +axq + bx. In case this polynomial admits a root x0 in
Fqn then we just take y2 = xq−10 . Otherwise, we will need to use a factorization
algorithm like in [Gie98].
Once A is computed, we can compute g0 and gk. Then we continue the
decoding algorithm with the same methods as with the Gabidulin codes.
Remark 10. These algorithms can be easily modified to get a decoding algorithm
for generalized (twisted) Gabidulin codes. Namely instead of working with the
field automorphism xq, we work with automorphisms of the form xqs .
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3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have given two algorithms for decoding rank metric codes.
The first algorithm was for twisted Gabidulin codes but it only works for some
parameters. For the second algorithm, we provided a new decoding algorithm for
Gabidulin codes and then we have shown how to modify it to get an algorithm
which works with any parameters of twisted Gabidulin codes. In this second
algorithm, instead of computing syndromes, we do some polynomial interpola-
tion. Our algorithm requires more computations in this first step but we can
compensate this in the last steps. Namely, there is no need to find roots of some
“error locator polynomial”. We just need to use a recurrence relation to recover
the “error polynomial” after using a Berlekamp-Massey-like algorithm. We gave
a brief analysis on the complexity and a comparison of our algorithm to some
existing decoding algorithms for Gabidulin codes. Furthermore, we show that
our algorithm can be modified to get a general decoding algorithm for twisted
Gabidulin codes.
We have seen that our algorithm involves factoring linearized polynomial of
degree q2. It is well known that factoring a regular polynomial of degree 2 can be
done by computing the discriminant of the polynomial. The algorithm presented
in [Gie98] gives a factorization for linearized polynomials of general degree, we
could further simplify our algorithm if we would have a discriminant like method
to factorize a degree q2 linearized polynomial.
Finally, we think that it is possible to get a version of our algorithm for Reed-
Solomon codes. Namely we can use an equivalent of the Dickson matrix. In
the case of Reed-Solomon codes, we have a circulant matrix. And a theorem
of König-Rados gives a relation between the number of non-zero roots of a
polynomial and the rank of some circulant matrix, see [LN96], Chapter 6, Section
1. It is known that the most expensive steps in the decoding of Reed-Solomon
codes is finding roots of the error locator polynomials. This can be avoided in our
algorithm. In the next chapter, we will see that there is a relation between the
rank of the circulant matrix and the codewords it defines. The rank of circulant
matrix in turn is equivalent to some linear complexity of finite sequence. This
prompts us to study the property of finite sequences and their linear complexity.
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Chapter 4
Coding Theory using Linear
Complexity of Finite Sequences
This Chapter is based on my work in [Ran18].
4.1 Motivation
As we will explain in this section, the notion of weight of vectors is closely related
to the notion of linear complexity of sequences. This motivates us to study the
linear complexity of sequences as a new metric. For us to see this relation, let
us first recall the construction of Reed-Solomon codes as we saw in Chapter 1,
Example 1.
Let Fq be a finite field of size q. We consider Reed-Solomon codes of length
q− 1. So let n = q− 1 and let α = (α1, · · · , αn) be a vector where its elements
are the non-zero elements of Fq. We define the evaluation map as
evα : Fq[x]→ Fnq
f(x) 7→ (f(α1), · · · , f(αn))
Let Fq[x]<k be the vector space of all polynomials of degree at most k − 1.
Then the image C = evα (Fq[x]<k) is an MDS code. This comes from the fact
that a polynomial of degree at most k − 1 can have at most k − 1 roots. The
code we described is called Reed-Solomon codes.
It is this relation between the property of the roots of polynomial which is
interesting for us. Let us see the following theorem of König-Rados. For a proof
of this theorem, one can have a look at Chapter 6 of [LN96].
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Theorem 16 (König-Rados). Let f(x) = a0 + a1x+ · · ·+ aq−2xq−2 be a poly-
nomial over F. Define the following matrix
A =

a0 a1 . . . aq−2
a1 .
. . . .
.
a0
... . .
.
. .
. ...
aq−2 a0 . . . aq−3
 .
Suppose that the rank of A is equal to r. Then the number of roots of f(x) in
F∗q is given by q − 1− r.
The matrix A in the above theorem is a circulant matrix. It is easy to see
that if its rank is equal to r, then the first r rows of A are linearly independent
and the other rows are linear combination of them. Furthermore, this tells us
that the coefficients of f(x) satisfy the following property.
ai+r =
r−1∑
j=0
cjai+j, ∀i ∈ N.
Note that the coefficients a0, · · · , aq−2 satisfy a recurrence relation of order
r. Using the definitions which we will see in Section 4.2, we say that the co-
efficients of the polynomials f(x) can be generated by a linear-feedback shift
register (LFSR) of order r and this is the minimum possible for r. We say that
(a0, · · · , aq−2) has linear complexity r. Moreover, our sequence gives a periodic
sequence with period q−1. To summarize, we have the following theorem, which
is a direct consequence of the theorem of König-Rados.
Theorem 17. Let f(x) = a0 + a1x + · · · + aq−2xq−2 be a polynomial over Fq.
If f(x) has q − 1− r roots, then (a0, · · · , aq−2) has linear complexity r and the
evaluation (f(α1), · · · , f(αn)) has weight r.
A more general version of Theorem 16 (or equivalently Theorem 17) is known
as Blahut’s theorem. It is for example stated in [Bla79] where they use some
notion of discrete Fourier transform. In this thesis, we will use the version as
stated in Theorems 16 and 17.
Through Theorem 17, we can relate the linear complexity of a periodic se-
quence with the weight of a vector. However, we have only periodic sequences.
This raises the following question: What happens if we study any type of se-
quence i.e. we don’t require the LFSR to be a periodic sequence with fixed
period. We will answer this question in the next sections. First, in Section 4.2,
we will introduce the notion of linear-feedback shift register. In Section 4.3,
we will give a coding theory for finite sequences. We will use Section 4.4 for a
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separate study on the number of finite sequences which can be generated by an
LFSR of given order. Finally, we will conclude with Section 4.5 and give some
future work.
4.2 Linear-feedback shift register
Let Fq be a finite field with q elements.
Definition 26. Let Fq be a field. A linear feedback shift register (LFSR) se-
quence over Fq is an infinite sequence (ai) over Fq such that there are fixed
cj ∈ Fq with,
ai+l =
l−1∑
j=0
cjai+j, ∀i ∈ N.
We also say that the sequence (ai) is generated by an LFSR of order l. The vector
(a0, · · · , al−1) is the initial state of the LFSR and the ci’s are its coefficients.
The feedback polynomial associated to (ai) is
f(z) = zl −
l−1∑
j=0
cjz
j.
Definition 27. Let (ai) be a sequence generated by an LFSR over Fq. The
generating function A(z) associated to (ai) is the formal power series
A(z) =
∞∑
i=0
aiz
i.
One can show (Chapter 8, [LN96]) that for some polynomial g(z) of degree
l − 1 at most, we have
A(z) = g(z)
f ∗(z) ,
where f ∗ is the reciprocal polynomial given by
f ∗(z) = zlf
(1
z
)
.
Definition 28. Given a non-zero finite sequence (ai) = (a0, · · · , an−1) ∈ Fnq ,
the linear complexity L(ai) of the sequence is the smallest l such that
ai+l =
l−1∑
j=0
cjai+j, ∀i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1− l,
for some fixed cj ∈ Fq. In other words, it is the order of the smallest LFSR which
can generate (ai).
For a zero sequence, we set the linear complexity to be equal to zero.
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Given a finite sequence, we can compute the shortest LFSR producing this
sequence. This can be done using the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm in O(n2)
field operations in Fq (Chapter 8, [LN96]). Furthermore if the linear complexity
is n/2, then n successive terms of the sequence are enough to uniquely find the
shortest shift register. We present the algorithm in Algorithm 3. On input, we
have a sequence s0, · · · , sn−1 of length n. On output, the algorithm generates
the order and the feedback polynomial f(z) of the shortest LFSR generating
s0, · · · , sn−1.
Algorithm 3 Berlekamp-Massey
1: procedure BERLEKAMP-MASSEY(s0, · · · , sn−1)
2: f(z)← 1, A(z)← 1,
3: L← 0, m = −1, e← 1
4: for i from 0 to n− 1 do
5: d← si +∑Lj=1 fjsi−j
6: if d 6= 0 then
7: B(z)← f(z)
8: f(z)← f(z)− (d/e)A(z)zi−m
9: if 2L ≤ i then
10: L← i+ 1− L
11: m← i
12: A(z)← B(z)
13: e← d
14: end if
15: end if
16: end for
17: return L and f(z)
18: end procedure
Proposition 10. Let (ai) = (a0, · · · , an−1) be a finite sequence of length n
over Fq. Then the linear complexity L(ai) satisfies L(ai) ≤ n. Furthermore the
only sequences attaining the upper bound n are of the form (0, · · · , 0, a), with
a ∈ F∗q.
Proof. We can just use an LFSR with (a0, · · · , an−1) as initial state so that
the maximum linear complexity is at most n. It is obvious that (0, · · · , 0, a) has
linear complexity n. Finally, if (ai) = (a0, · · · , an−1) is such that aj 6= 0 for some
j with 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 2, then take ci = 0 for i 6= j. Define cj = an−1/aj. We
prove that an−1 =
∑n−2
j=0 cjaj so that the linear complexity is at least n− 1.
The key property of the linear complexity of sequences which will be used
later is the following known theorem.
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Theorem 18. Let (ai) and (bi) be two finite sequences. If (ci) = (ai) + (bi),
then
L(ci) ≤ L(ai) + L(bi).
Proof. Suppose that the generating function of the LFSR generating (ai) and
(bi) are respectively
ga(z)
f ∗a (z)
, and gb(z)
f ∗b (z)
.
Then the generating function of the LFSR generating (ci) is
ga(z)f ∗b (z) + gb(z)f ∗a (z)
f ∗a (z)f ∗b (z)
.
And therefore, (ci) can be generated by an LFSR with feedback polynomial
fa(z)fb(z). Therefore the linear complexity is at most L(ai) + L(bi).
4.3 A coding theory for finite sequences using
the linear complexity
Let Fq be a finite field and let n be a positive integer. We will consider sets of
sequences of length n.
Definition 29. Let (ai) = (a0, · · · , an−1) ∈ Fnq and (bi) = (b0, · · · , bn−1) ∈ Fnq
be two finite sequences of n elements of Fq each. Then we define a distance on
Fnq by the following,
d((ai), (bi)) = L((ai)− (bi)),
where L(0) = 0.
This map defines indeed a distance:
(i) By definition, d((ai), (bi)) = 0⇔ (ai) = (bi).
(ii) By definition of L, L(ai) ≥ 0.
(iii) d((ai), (bi)) = d((bi), (ai)).
(iv) For the triangular inequality,
d((ai), (bi)) = L((ai)− (bi))
= L((ai)− (ci) + (ci)− (bi))
≤ L((ai)− (ci)) + L((ci)− (bi)), by Theorem 18
= d((ai), (ci)) + d((ci), (bi)).
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Like in coding theory, we can define a subset of Fnq and define the metric d
on this set. We will derive basic coding results for this context.
Definition 30. Let S be a subset of Fnq . The minimum distance d of S is
the minimum of d((ai), (bi)) for distinct (ai), (bi) ∈ S. We will describe the
parameters of S as [n, ]S, d]. In case S is a k-dimensional subspace of Fnq , then,
by additivity, d is the minimum linear complexity of the non-zero sequences in S
and we will write [n, k, d].
For the next steps we want to have a look at the bounds on a [n, ]S, d]-subset
of Fnq .
Theorem 19 (Singleton bound). Let Fq be a finite field of size q. Let S ⊂ Fnq
be a set of finite sequence over Fq of length n, with minimum distance d. Then
]S ≤ qn−d+1.
Proof. Let us define the following linear map P as
P : Fnq → Fn−d+1q
(a0, · · · , an−1)→
(
1 . . . 1
)
a0 . . . an−d
...
. . .
...
ad−1 . . . an−1

The restriction of this map must be injective on S. Otherwise if two sequences
(ai) and (bi) are mapped to the same image, then (ai) − (bi) is mapped to
zero. But this would imply that L ((ai)− (bi)) ≤ d− 1. This is in contradiction
with the minimum distance of S. By the injectivity, we must have that ]S ≤
](Fn−d+1q ).
Note that in this proof, instead of using
(
1 . . . 1
)
, we can use any vector
with 1 as last entry. These operations are equivalent to the puncturing operation
on codes. Namely using
(
0 . . . 0 1
)
is just puncturing at the first d − 1
positions.
Remark 11. In case S is linear of dimension k over Fq, then k ≤ n− d+ 1.
Definition 31 (Optimal set of sequences - OSS). We call a set of sequences S
optimal if the minimum distance of S reaches the bound of the previous theorem
i.e. if S has elements of length n and minimum distance d and ]S = qn−d+1.
Example 3. Let S be the set of sequences of length n over a finite field Fq defined
by
S = {(0, · · · , 0, a1, · · · , ak) : ai ∈ Fq}.
Then, S is an optimal set of linear sequences of dimension k. That is because
the sequences cannot be generated by an LFSR of order smaller than n− k + 1
except when it is the zero sequence.
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The nice property of using the set of sequences with the linear complexity as
metric is that, in opposite to maximum distance separable codes, we can have
optimal set of sequences for any parameters. We can make the construction,
even for the binary field.
Decoding of OSS
The decoding of OSS given in Example 3 is straightforward. First let us look at
the unique decoding property.
Proposition 11. Suppose that S is an [n,M, d] set of sequences. Suppose that
y ∈ Fq is equal to x+ e, where x ∈ S and L(e) < d2 . Then, the decomposition
x + e is unique.
Proof. If y = x1 +e1 = x2 +e2, then x1−x2 = e2−e1. Therefore d(x1, x2) =
L(e2 − e1). By Theorem 18, d(x1, x2) ≤ L(e2) + L(e1) < d. This is in
contradiction with the minimum distance of S.
Let S, of dimension k, be the OSS in Example 3. Suppose that we know
y = x + e with x ∈ S and L(e) < n−k+12 . By Proposition 11, we know that e
is unique. Since the n − k first entries of x are equal to zero. Then we know
the first n − k entries of e. Now, since L(e) < n−k+12 , then we can uniquely
recover the LFSR generating e by using the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm on the
first n− k entries of e. We are therefore able to produce the whole e and then
we compute x = y− e.
Remark 12. We can modify the above decoding algorithm to get a decoding
algorithm for the Reed-Solomon code in Section 4.1. The extra step is just
that we need to interpolate a received codewords first to get a polynomial f(x)
of degree q − 2 at most. After this we apply the decoding algorithm for the
OSS we gave above on the coefficients of this polynomial f(x). Notice that the
Berlekamp-Massey in this case is applied to the last coefficients of the polynomial
f(x).
4.4 Number of finite sequences generated by a
linear feedback shift register with a given or-
der
LFSR already has applications in cryptography. For instance, it is used when
one wants to generate random keys. As we have seen, one can compute the
linear complexity of a sequence using the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm. Thus, if
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a sequence has small linear complexity, one can easily find an LFSR generating
this sequence. Due to this fact, we usually want to have sequences with large
linear complexity. Therefore, one important question is to know how many finite
sequences have large linear complexity. Another motivation for this section is also
that knowing the number of sequences with a given linear complexity is important
for the security aspect of a code-based cryptosystem using linear complexity as
metric.
Lemma 15. Let (ai) be an infinite sequence. If (ai) can be generated by an
LFSR of order n, then (ai) can be generated by an LFSR of order i, for any
i ≥ n.
Proof. For a proof of this, if c1, · · · , cn are the coefficients of the LFSR of order
n, then 0, · · · , 0, c1, · · · , ci are the coefficients of the larger LFSRs.
By Lemma 15, we can just study the number of sequences which can be
generated by an LFSRs of order r to know the number of sequences which
has linear complexity smaller or equal to r. Studying sequences which can be
generated by an LFSRs of order r can be in turn translated to studying some
matrix A of the form
A =

a0 a1 . . . . . . an−r−1
a1 .
. . . .
.
an−r−1 an−r
... . .
.
. .
.
. .
. ...
ar ar+1 . . . . . . an−1

We just need the condition that the last row is a linear combination of the
previous rows. The matrices with the form of A are called Hankel matrices when
they are square matrices. A similar problem, which was counting the number
of singular Hankel matrices, were solved by observing the Berlekamp-Massey
algorithm [CK12]. However, we will use another method. We give a general
definition for rectangular matrices.
Definition 32. An (m × n) matrix A is called a Hankel matrix if there is a
sequence (a0, a1, · · · , am+n−2) such that Ai,j = ai+j−2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and
1 ≤ j ≤ n.
In [Day60], Daykin called the general rectangular matrices persymmetric ma-
trices. To go further with our counting, we will need the following reduction
method as used by Daykin in [Day60].
Fix and integer u such that 0 ≤ u < min(r, n − r − 1). We define the
following set
Au = {(0, · · · , 0, au, · · · , an−1) : au 6= 0}.
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Then for (ai) ∈ Au, we recursively define θi, i = 0, · · · , n− u− 1 byauθ0 = 1∑i
l=0 au+lθi−l = 0
.
Now define the following matrices
U =

θ0 0 0 . . . 0
θ1 θ0 0
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . . 0
...
. . .
. . .
. . . 0
θr . . . . . . θ1 θ0
 , V =

θ0 θ1 . . . . . . θn−r−1
0 θ0 θ1
. . .
...
0 . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . . θ1
0 . . . 0 0 θ0

X =

0 . . . 0 0 θ0
... . .
. 0 θ0 θ1
0 . . . . . . . . .
...
0 θ0 . .
.
. .
. ...
θ0 θ1 . . . . . . θu
 , Y =

θu+2 θu+3 . . . . . . θn−r
θu+3 .
. . . .
.
θn−r−1 θn−r+1
... . .
.
. .
.
. .
. ...
... θr+1 .
. . . .
.
θn−u−2
θr+1 θr+2 . . . θn−u−2 θn−u−1

Lemma 16. For a fixed u with 0 ≤ u < min(r, n− r − 1), there is a bijection
between Au and the set {(θ0, · · · , θn−u−1) : θ0 ∈ F∗q, θi ∈ Fq, 1 ≤ i ≤ n−u−1}
given by
UAV =
(
X 0
0 −Y
)
.
Proof. First let us show that
UAV =
(
X 0
0 −Y
)
.
We know that Ai,k = ai+k for 0 ≤ i ≤ r and 0 ≤ k ≤ n− r− 1. For the matrix
V, the entries satisfies Vj,k = 0 if j < k and Vj,k = θk−j if k ≤ j. And for the
matrix U, Ui,k = 0 if k > i and Ui,k = θi−k if k ≤ i. Thus
(UAV)i,j =
i∑
k=0
θi−k
 j∑
l=0
ak+lθj−l
 ,
0 ≤ i ≤ r0 ≤ j ≤ n− r − 1 .
We are now going to look at three different cases:
• Suppose that i ≤ u, Since a0 = a1 = · · · = au−1 = 0, then
(UAV)i,j =
i∑
k=0
θi−k
 j∑
l=u−k
ak+lθj−l
 ,
0 ≤ i ≤ r0 ≤ j ≤ n− r − 1 .
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After a change of variable
(UAV)i,j =
i∑
k=0
θi−k
j−u+k∑
l=0
au+lθj−u+k−l
 ,
0 ≤ i ≤ r0 ≤ j ≤ n− r − 1 .
By the recurrence relation on the θi’s, we know that
j−u+k∑
l=0
au+lθj−u+k−l =
1, if j − u+ k = 00, otherwise
And thus
(UAV)i,j =
θi+j−u, if 0 ≤ u− j ≤ i0, otherwise
• Now, suppose that i > u and j ≤ u. Since, j ≤ u, then we can use the
expression
(UAV)i,j =
j∑
l=0
θj−l
[
i∑
k=0
ak+lθi−k
]
,
0 ≤ i ≤ r0 ≤ j ≤ n− r − 1 .
We use the same transformation as before to get
(UAV)i,j =
j∑
l=0
θj−l
[
i−u+l∑
k=0
au+kθi−u+l−k
]
,
0 ≤ i ≤ r0 ≤ j ≤ n− r − 1 .
and
i−u+l∑
k=0
au+kθi−u+l−k =
1, if i− u+ l = 00, otherwise.
Since u < i, then the first case is never possible, therefore (UAV)i,j is
always zero.
• Finally, suppose that i > u and j > u. We have
(UAV)i,j =
j∑
l=0
θj−l
[
i∑
k=0
ak+lθi−k
]
= (UAV)i,u +
j∑
l=u+1
θj−l
[
i∑
k=0
ak+lθi−k
]
=
j∑
l=u+1
θj−l
 i∑
k=u−l
ak+lθi−k −
−1∑
k=u−l
ak+lθi−k
 .
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The last equality contains the subtraction because by starting k with u− l,
we have some negative value for the index k, so we have to remove them.
Finally, we have
(UAV)i,j = −
j∑
l=u+1
θj−l
−1∑
k=u−l
ak+lθi−k
= −
−1∑
k=u−j
θi−k
j∑
l=u−k
ak+lθj−l
= −
−1∑
k=u−j
θi−k
j−u+k∑
l=0
au+lθj−u+k−l.
By the recurrence relation on the θi’s, we have
(UAV)i,j = −θi+j−u.
For the bijection, suppose that A and A′ both give the same θi’s, then
UAV = UA′V, but since U and V are invertible, then A = A′. We have an
injection between two sets of the same size, therefore it is a bijection.
Lemma 17. Suppose that A is the matrix corresponding to the sequence (ai) ∈
Au, and it corresponds to the matrices U,V,X,Y. Then the last row of A is
a linear combination of its other rows if and only if the last row of Y is a linear
combination of its other rows.
Proof. We know that
AV = U−1
(
X 0
0 −Y
)
Thus if (λ0, · · · , λr−1, 1)AV = 0, then
(λ0, · · · , λr−1, 1)U−1
(
X 0
0 −Y
)
= 0
Therefore, there is some non-zero µr with,
(µ0, · · · , µr−1, µr)
(
X 0
0 −Y
)
= 0.
Since µr 6= 0, then the last row of Y is a linear combination of its previous row.
The converse can be proven by going backward.
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Definition 33. Define B(n, r, u) to be the set of non-zero sequences (ai) of
length n with linear complexity r at most such that u is the smallest index
i such that ai is non-zero. We also define B(n, r) to be the set of all se-
quences (ai) of length n with linear complexity at most r. Therefore B(n, r) =(
∪n−1u=0B(n, r, u)
)
∪ {0}. We set b(n, r, u) = ]B(n, r, u) and b(n, r) = ]B(n, r).
Now, suppose that r + 1 ≤ n− r. If u < r, then we use the above method
for reduction. Otherwise if u ≥ r, then the first r elements of (ai) are 0 and
therefore we can only get the zero sequence.
Next, if n − r ≤ r, then again we use the above reduction method for
u < n − r − 1. If r > u ≥ n − r − 1, then for any choice of the remaining
coefficients au+1, · · · , an−1, it is always possible to generate it using an LFSR of
order r. If u ≥ r, then there is no LFSR of order at most r which can generate
the sequence.
These, together with Lemmas 15 and 17 allow us to get the next theorem.
Theorem 20.
(i) If r + 1 ≤ n− r and u ≥ r, then b(n, r, u) = 0.
(ii) If n− r ≤ r and r > u ≥ n− r − 1, then b(n, r, u) = qn−u−1(q − 1).
(iii) If n− r ≤ r and u ≥ r, then b(n, r, u) = 0.
(iv) If r + 1 ≤ n − r and u < r, or n − r ≤ r and u < n − r − 1 then
b(n, r, u) = qu+1(q − 1)b(n− 2u− 2, r − u− 1).
Proof. Lemma 15 tells us all elements of B(n, r) can be generated by an LFSR
of order r. Hence, we study only matrices in the form of A. For (i), one can just
write down the matrix A and see that it has a triangular shape where the last
row is never a linear combination of the previous row. For (ii), we again look at
the form of the matrix A, we will see that some first non-zero rows of A make
an invertible matrix and thus the last row is always a linear combination of the
rows of that invertible matrix whatever the choice of the coefficients we choose
after au. For (iii), looking at the form of the matrix will also give the result. For
(iv), we use the bijection in Lemma 16 and Lemma 17.
Summing all the possibilities in Theorem 20, we get the following corollaries.
Corollary 2. Given two integers r ≤ n, the number of finite sequence of length
n with linear complexity at most r is equal to
(i) If r = 0, b(n, 0) = 1.
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(ii) If r + 1 ≤ n− r,
b(n, r) = 1 +
r−1∑
u=0
qu+1(q − 1)b(n− 2u− 2, r − u− 1).
(iii) If n− r ≤ r,
b(n, r) = 1+
n−r−2∑
u=0
qu+1(q−1)b(n−2u−2, r−u−1)+
r−1∑
u=n−r−1
(q−1)qn−u−1.
Corollary 3. Given two integers r ≤ n, the number of finite sequences of length
n with linear complexity at most r is equal to 1 if r = 0 and if 0 < r ≤ n,
b(n, r) = 1− q + q2b(n− 2, r − 1).
Proof. Suppose that r + 1 ≤ n− r. Then,
b(n, r) = 1 +
r−1∑
u=0
qu+1(q − 1)b(n− 2u− 2, r − u− 1)
= 1 + q(q − 1)b(n− 2, r − 1)
+
r−1∑
u=1
qu+1(q − 1)b(n− 2u− 2, r − u− 1)
= 1 + q(q − 1)b(n− 2, r − 1)
+ q
r−2∑
u=0
qu+1(q − 1)b(n− 2u− 4, r − u− 2)
= 1 + q(q − 1)b(n− 2, r − 1) + qb(n− 2, r − 1)− q
= 1− q + q2b(n− 2, r − 1)
Now suppose that n− r ≤ r. Then,
b(n, r) = 1 +
r−1∑
u=n−r−1
(q − 1)qn−u−1
+
n−r−2∑
u=0
qu+1(q − 1)b(n− 2u− 2, r − u− 1)
= 1 +
r−1∑
u=n−r−1
(q − 1)qn−u−1 + q(q − 1)b(n− 2, r − 1)
+ q
n−r−2∑
u=1
qu(q − 1)b(n− 2u− 2, r − u− 1)
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= 1 +
r−1∑
u=n−r−1
(q − 1)qn−u−1 + q(q − 1)b(n− 2, r − 1)
+ q
n−r−3∑
u=0
qu+1(q − 1)b(n− 2u− 4, r − u− 2)
= 1 +
r−1∑
u=n−r−1
(q − 1)qn−u−1 + q(q − 1)b(n− 2, r − 1)
+ q
b(n− 2, r − 1)− 1− r−2∑
u=n−r−2
(q − 1)qn−u−3

= 1− q + q2b(n− 2, r − 1) +
r−1∑
u=n−r−1
(q − 1)qn−u−1
− q
r−2∑
u=n−r−2
(q − 1)qn−u−3
= 1− q + q2b(n− 2, r − 1)
+ (q − 1)
 r−1∑
u=n−r−1
qn−u−1 −
r−2∑
u=n−r−2
qn−u−2

= 1− q + q2b(n− 2, r − 1)
+ (q − 1)
 r−1∑
u=n−r−1
qn−u−1 −
r−1∑
u=n−r−1
qn−u−1

= 1− q + q2b(n− 2, r − 1).
As a consequence of the corollaries, we get the following theorem.
Theorem 21. Given two integers r ≤ n, the number of finite sequences of
length n with linear complexity at most r is
(i) If r = 0, b(n, 0) = 1.
(ii) If r + 1 ≤ n− r,
b(n, r) = q
2r+1 + 1
q + 1 .
(iii) If n− r ≤ r,
b(n, r) = 1− q
2(n−r)
1 + q + q
n.
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Proof. Suppose that r + 1 ≤ n− r. From the previous corollary,
r−1∑
i=0
q2ib(n− 2i, r − i) = (1− q)
r−1∑
i=0
q2i +
r−1∑
i=0
q2(i+1)b(n− 2(i+ 1), r − (i+ 1)).
Thus
r−1∑
i=0
q2ib(n− 2i, r − i) = (1− q)
r−1∑
i=0
q2i +
r∑
i=1
q2ib(n− 2i, r − i).
Therefore,
b(n, r) = (1− q)
r−1∑
i=0
q2i + q2r = q2r + 1− q
2r
1 + q .
And we get the result.
If n− r ≤ r, then r ≥ n2 . So using this,
n−r−1∑
i=0
q2ib(n−2i, r−i) = (1−q)
n−r−1∑
i=0
q2i+
n−r−1∑
i=0
q2(i+1)b(n−2(i+1), r−(i+1)).
Therefore
b(n, r) = (1− q)
n−r−1∑
i=0
q2i + q2(n−r)b(2r − n, 2r − n),
Since B(2r − n, 2r − n) = F2r−n, then
b(n, r) = (1− q)1− q
2(n−r)
1− q2 + q
n.
And we get our result.
Using the previous theorem, we can compute the number of finite sequences
with a fixed linear complexity.
Theorem 22. Let r ≤ n be positive integers. Then, the number of sequences
of length n and linear complexity r over a finite field F of size q is
1 if r = 0,
q2r−1(q − 1) if r ≤ bn2 c,
q2(n−r)(q − 1) if r > bn2 c.
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Proof. The case r = 0 is clear. For r = 1, we get that the number of sequences
of length n and linear complexity r over a finite field F of size q is
q3 − q
q + 1 = q(q − 1).
Now, suppose that r = dn2 e. Then the number we want is given by
qn − q
2(n−r) + q2r−1
q + 1 =
q2r−1(q − 1) if n is even,q2(n−r)(q − 1) if n is odd.
It is easy to check that if r ≤ dn2 e − 1, then the number is
q2r−1(q − 1),
and if dn2 e+ 1, the number is
q2(n−r)(q − 1).
Furthermore {r ≤ dn2 e − 1} and {r = dn2 e, n even} are the same as {r ≤ bn2 c}.
Finally {r ≥ dn2 e+ 1} and {r = dn2 e, n odd} are the same as {r > bn2 c}.
Since we also know the size of balls with respect to the linear complexity
from Theorem 21, we can give a formula for the Sphere packing bound.
Theorem 23 (Sphere packing bound). Let S be a set of sequences of length n
and with minimum distance d. Then
]S ≤

qn(q+1)
q2b
d−1
2 c+1
if 2bd−12 c ≤ n− 1,
qn(q+1)
1−q2(n−b d−12 c)+(1+q)qn
if 2bd−12 c > n− 1.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Theorem 21 and using the fact that the
union of the spheres of radius bd−12 c centered at the sequences in S is a disjoint
union.
4.5 Conclusion and future work
We have seen how the notion of weight of vectors can be extended to the notion
of linear complexity of finite sequences. Using the new metric defined by the
linear complexity, we developed a coding theory for finite sequences. We gave the
Singleton bound and we presented a construction for an optimal set of sequences
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reaching this bound. Then we computed an exact formula for the number of
finite sequences which can be generated by an LFSR of a fixed order.
LFSR have been extensively studied [Rue86]. It is widely used in the gener-
ation of random secret key in symmetric cryptography. Our main goal however
is to use the LFSR and linear complexity to get a new protocol for asymmetric
public key cryptography.
In 1978, McEliece proposed a new cryptosystem using binary linear codes
(Goppa codes) with the Hamming metric [McE78]. After 40 years of cryptanal-
ysis, the cryptosystem is still considered to be structurally secure. However, the
cryptosystem requires the use of public keys with large size. This makes it im-
practical for daily use. The advantage of using linear codes is that cryptosystem
based on them are in general safe against quantum computers. Namely, there is
no general algorithm which can decode a random linear code in polynomial time.
The strength of the McEliece cryptosystem is that Goppa codes look like
random linear codes and it is considered to be a difficult problem to decode a
random linear code. To solve the problem with the key size, it was suggested to
use different family of linear codes. For instance, Niederreiter proposed a new
cryptosystem using Reed-Solomon codes [Nie86]. However, cryptosystems using
Reed-Solomon codes were proven to be insecure [SS92]. Several types of codes
were suggested to get a secure cryptosystem. Another suggestion was that,
instead of using the classical Hamming metric on the linear code, one can use
the rank metric. For instance, a new cryptosystem based on the Gabidulin codes
were proposed [GPT91]. This system was still proven to be insecure [Ove08].
Recently, this increased the interest in the search of linear codes with good
properties which can be used in cryptography both in Hamming and rank metric.
There is another cryptosystem which are also using a set and a metric on the set.
The lattice based cryptosystem is the scheme where the metric is the Euclidean
distance [Ajt96]. This particular cryptosystem is also resistant against attacks
from quantum computers.
Motivated by all of this, we may think of a cryptosystem using the linear
complexity as metric. We will see this in the next chapter. Finally we all know
that Hamming metric codes are good for error correcting in a q-ary symmetric
channel. For rank metric codes, they have good applications in network coding
[KK08, SKK08]. It is our hope that the presented coding framework will also
be of use for some particular channel.
74 CHAPTER 4. A METRIC ON SEQUENCES
Chapter 5
A new public key cryptosystem
based on linear complexity of
finite sequences
5.1 Introduction
The most popular public key encryption scheme used today are based on either
the difficulty of factoring integers (RSA for example) or the difficulty of computing
discrete logarithms in some group (elliptic curves for example). However, with the
design of quantum computers, these schemes will soon be considered insecure by
the use of Shor’s algorithm [Sho94] when such computers are built. Fortunately,
there are some public key encryption schemes which still resist the quantum
computer attack. One alternative is the multivariate cryptosystems [DGS06].
Three other alternatives are the McEliece cryptosystem [McE78], the variants
of GPT cryptosystem [GPT91] and the lattice based cryptosystem [Ajt96]. The
multivariate cryptosystem is based on the fact that it is generally difficult to solve
a non-linear system of polynomial equation in several variables. The common
aspect of the other cryptosystems is that they use a module over some ring
together with a metric. The security of the cryptosystem is based on the difficulty
of some problem, mainly finding the closest vector with respect to the metric.
For lattice based cryptosystem, they are using lattices in Rn and the metric is the
Euclidean distance. For the McEliece cryptosystem, linear codes i.e. subspaces
of Fnq are used together with the Hamming metric. For the GPT cryptosystem,
they use linear codes but the metric is the rank metric [Gab85].
In Chapter 4, we have introduced a new metric on the vector space Fnq by
using the linear complexity of finite sequences. In a paper [Ran18], we made a
coding theory study on the vector space Fnq with the linear complexity as metric.
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There, it was already mentioned that using the linear complexity is somehow
a generalization of the Hamming metric. In fact when considering periodic se-
quences with the fixed period, they are the same notion. However, in a more
general setting, we have considered sequences without condition on the periods.
From this, the idea of replacing the Hamming metric by the linear complexity to
construct a McEliece-like cryptosystem comes up. Hence we present this work
about a cryptosystem using linear complexity as metric. Linear feedback-shift
registers have already some application in symmetric cryptography. A good ref-
erence for that is the book [Eli18]. However the application that we present
here is completely new. First in Section 5.2, we will recall the notion of linear
feedback-shift register, linear complexity and we will also restate some results
from Chapter 4, which we will need in this Chapter. In Section 5.3, we will
present a general construction for the cryptosystem. Then we will be more pre-
cise in Section 5.4. There, we will present a particular construction for the
cryptosystem. In Section 5.5, we will show how secure the general scheme is by
reducing the coset weight problem of [BMvT78] to the linear complexity coset
weight problem. Finally, we will conclude in Section 5.6.
5.2 Linear-feedback shift register sequence and
linear complexity
Many of the results in this section were taken from [Kle13] and Chapter 4 [Ran18].
Most of the statements here are given without proof. We refer the user to the
previous chapter or the previously mentioned references if proofs are needed.
Unless otherwise specified, we will always be working on a finite field Fq with q
elements.
Recall from Definition 28 that, given a finite sequence (ai) = (a1, · · · , an),
the linear complexity L(ai) of the sequence is the smallest integer l such that
ai+l =
l−1∑
j=0
cjai+j, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− l − 1,
for some fixed cj ∈ Fq. In case (ai) is the zero sequence, then we define
L(ai) = 0.
As we have seen in Algorithm 3, Chapter 4, the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm
can be used to find the shortest LFSR, i.e. the LFSR with the smallest order,
generating a finite sequence. This can be done in O(n2) field operations in Fq,
where n is the length of the sequence ([Kle13], Chapter 2, Section 4).
The key property of the linear complexity of sequences which will be used
later is the following result from Theorem 18 of Chapter 4.
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If (ai) and (bi) are two finite sequences and if (ci) = (ai) + (bi), then
L(ci) ≤ L(ai) + L(bi).
This is a triangular inequality. And as we have seen in the previous chapter,
this triangular inequality leads to the construction of a metric.
Definition 34. Let (ai) = (a1, · · · , an) ∈ Fnq and (bi) = (b1, · · · , bn) ∈ Fnq be
two finite sequences of n elements of Fq each. Then we define a distance on Fnq
by the following,
d((ai), (bi)) = L ((ai)− (bi)) ,
where L(0) = 0.
Like in classical coding theory, we can take a subset of Fnq and then define
the metric d on this set. For application in cryptography, we will be interested
in subspaces of Fnq only.
Definition 35. Let S be a subspace of Fnq . The minimum distance d of S is
the minimum of d((ai), (bi)) for any (ai), (bi) ∈ S such that (ai) 6= (bi). If
the dimension of S as a subspace of Fnq is equal to k, then we write [n, k, d] to
describe S.
The Singleton bound is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 24 ([Ran18]). Let Fq be a finite field with q elements. Let S ⊂ Fnq be
an [n, k, d]-subspace of finite sequences. Then k ≤ n− d+ 1. If k = n− d+ 1,
then S is said to be an optimal set of sequences (OSS).
Optimal sets of sequences can be constructed for any parameters q, n, k. To
do this, let S be the subspace of Fnq defined by
S = {(0, · · · , 0, a1, · · · , ak) : ai ∈ Fq} .
This is an optimal set of sequences.
Furthermore, we will also need the following property of finite sequences.
Theorem 25 ([Ran18]). Let Fq be a finite field with q elements. Let r ≤ n be
two non-negative integers. Let B(n, r) be the set of all finite sequences (ai) of
length n over Fq such that L(ai) ≤ r and let b(n, r) = ]B(n, r). Then
b(n, r) =

1 if r = 0,
q2r+1+1
q+1 if r ≤ n−12 ,
1−q2(n−r)
1+q + q
n if r ≥ n2 .
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As a consequence of Theorem 25, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4 ([Ran18]). For two positive integers r ≤ n, the number of sequences
of length n with linear complexity r over a finite field Fq of size q is
1 if r = 0,
q2r−1(q − 1) if r ≤
⌊
n
2
⌋
,
q2(n−r)(q − 1) if r >
⌊
n
2
⌋
,
Apart from the triangular inequality in Theorem 18, we also have a similar
statement with respect to the multiplication between two sequences.
Definition 36. Let (ai) and (bi) be two sequences. We define the product
(ai) ∗ (bi) as the sequence (ci) such that ci = aibi, for all integer i.
Similar to Theorem 18, we have that the linear complexity of the product of
two linear feedback shift register sequences is at most the product of the linear
complexities of the two sequences. A proof of this fact can for example be found
in [Kle13], Chapter 3, Section 4. Using this property we have the following
theorem when we switch to sequences of finite length.
Theorem 26. Let (ai) and (bi) be two sequences of finite length over a finite
field Fq. Then L((ai) ∗ (bi)) ≤ L(ai)L(bi).
We are now ready to move the construction of the cryptosystem.
5.3 A new cryptosystem based on LFSR
Similarly to the case of codes with the Hamming metric, we have the following
problem on which our cryptosystem will be based.
Linear complexity coset weight problem: Given a random subspace S
of Fnq , a finite sequence (bi) ∈ Fnq and a positive integer w, find the sequence
(ai) ∈ S such that d((ai), (bi)) ≤ w.
If the set S has parameters [n, k, d], then using the triangular inequality for d,
it is easy to show that the solution of the linear complexity coset weight problem
(if it exists) is unique when w < d2 .
We will later prove in Section 5.5 that for random subspace S, this problem
is difficult to solve. However, there are some instances of S, where it is easy to
solve this problem. Recall the following construction of optimal set of sequences
S we have seen in Section 5.2.
S = {(0, · · · , 0, a1, · · · , ak) : ai ∈ Fq}.
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Here we have that d = n− k + 1. So assume that L(bi) < d2 . Suppose also
that we know the sequence (ai) + (bi) such that (ai) ∈ S. We are therefore
asked to recover (ai) from (ai)+(bi). However, by the property of S, we directly
know the first n− k elements of (bi). And since, L(bi) < n−k+12 , we can use the
Berlekamp-Massey algorithm to recover the linear feedback-shift register which
generates (bi). And the solution is unique with the property that L(ai) < n−k+12 .
Using this linear feedback-shift register, we can recover the whole sequence (bi).
Once we recover (bi), we can compute (ai) at the end.
Let us now describe the cryptosystem. let S be a vector space of finite
sequences over Fq with parameters [n, k, d]. Suppose that we are in possession
of an algorithm for solving the linear complexity coset weight problem for S when
L(bi) < d2 . Then we set the following cryptosystem.
The public key is a basis of S as a subspace of Fnq . This is generally rep-
resented by a generator matrix G, and an integer t < d2 . Notice that G is a
(k × n)-matrix of rank k over Fq. The secret key is the algorithm for finding
the closest sequence i.e. for solving the linear complexity coset problem for the
particular sequence S.
The encryption is done as follow:
(i) The message m ∈ Fkq is encoded as an element (ai) = mG of S.
(ii) The user chooses a random sequence (bi) ∈ Fnq such that L(bi) ≤ t.
(iii) Then (ci) = (ai) + (bi) is sent as ciphertext.
The decryption is just finding the element (ai) of S which is closest to (ci)
using the secret algorithm. Since G is of rank k, and thus defines an injective
map, we can invert it to recover m from (ai).
Remark 13. The integer t is chosen in such a way that the decryption always
gives a unique solution. This is similar to the unique decoding problem.
The security of the new cryptosystem we give is based on the hardness of
solving the linear complexity coset weight problem. However we are facing the
following challenge. First we need to know a set of linear sequences S with
a given algorithm. Secondly, we also need to make sure that knowing S, it
should not be possible for an attacker to find an efficient decoding algorithm.
For instance a direct use of the optimal set of sequences we have seen previously
is not possible since we know that the first elements of the ciphertext directly
comes from the error introduced in the encryption and therefore we can decode it
using the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm. So, what we need to do is to transform
G to make it look like a random matrix. For that we give a modification of the
previous cryptosystem.
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The secret keys are an [n, k, d] set of sequences S given by a generator matrix
G ∈ Fk×nq and an (n×n) invertible matrix X over Fq. Here we can still take the
previously constructed optimal set of sequence. However, we will disguise it by
using the matrix X. Hence the public keys are the product GX and an integer
t.
The encryption is done as follow:
(i) The message m ∈ Fkq is encoded as (ai) = mGX.
(ii) Then the user chooses a random sequence (bi) with L(bi) ≤ t.
(iii) then (ci) = (ai) + (bi) is sent as ciphertext.
For the decryption: first compute (ci)X−1. Then we look for mG which is
the closest sequence to mG+ (bi)X−1.
However, in order to solve the linear complexity coset weight problem in
the set S with input mG + (bi)X−1, we need to make sure that our decoding
algorithm will work. Therefore, we also need that L ((bi)X−1) is still smaller
than n−k+12 . Thus, we need to choose X to have some property. Furthermore,
X should also be chosen so that knowing GX, it should not be easy to recover
G or a decoding algorithm.
5.4 A particular construction
As we have seen in the previous section, directly using finite sequences starting
with many zeroes is not a good idea. However, to be able to decode, we still
want to use these sequences. Let n > k be two positive integers and let Fq be
a field of size q. All objects will always have entries over Fq.
Let G1 be a random invertible (k × k) matrix and 0 be the (k × (n − k))
zero matrix. We also randomly generate a (k× (n− k)) matrix G2. Using these
matrices, we construct a matrix G = [0|G1|G2].
Define S to be the vector space of finite sequences
(ai) = (a1, · · · , an, · · · , a2n−k),
of length 2n − k generated by the rows of G. We have that ai = 0 for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n− k.
We fix t < n−k+14 . We define the ((2n− k)× (2n− k)) invertible matrix M
such that
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M−1 =

u1 0 . . . 0 m1,1 . . . m1,n−k
u2 u1
. . .
. . . m2,1 . . . m2,n−k
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . . u2 u1 mn,1
. . . mn,n−k
...
. . .
. . . u2
...
. . .
...
un−k+1
. . .
. . .
...
... . . .
...
0 un−k+1
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0 un−k+1 m2n−k,1 . . . m2n−k,n−k

(5.1)
We choose the ui and the mi,j so thatM−1 is invertible and henceM exists.
We choose a sequence (h1, · · · , h2n−k) with linear complexity exactly 2. And we
defined the diagonal matrix H = diag(h1, · · · , h2n−k). We also need H to be
invertible and thus we choose (h1, · · · , h2n−k) not to contain any zero element.
This also implies that we have to work with field larger than F2. We now define
X−1 = HM−1.
The secret key is nowG andX−1. The public key isG′ = GX and a positive
integer t. We defined the rowspace of G′ as S ′. Encryption and decryption is
done similarly as in the previous section:
(i) The message m ∈ Fnq is encoded as (ai) = mG′ ∈ S ′.
(ii) Then the user chooses a random sequence (ei) with L(ei) ≤ t
(iii) Then (ci) = (ai) + (ei) is sent as ciphertext.
Remark 14. Notice that we encrypt messages of length k into a ciphertext of
length 2n− k. The encryption rate is therefore k2n−k .
The next step is to show that the decryption works i.e. we can solve the
linear complexity coset weight problem uniquely in S ′. To decrypt, first we
compute (ci)X−1. Thus we getmG+(ei)X−1. We now need to solve the linear
complexity coset weight problem in S to get mG and finally recover m from
this. So, what remains to show is that we can recover mG uniquely.
Let us have a look at (ei)X−1 with L(ei) ≤ t. We have (ei)X−1 =
(ei)HM−1. So if we set (bi) = (ei)H, then by Theorem 26, we have that
L(bi) ≤ 2L(ei) ≤ 2t. Now we have (ei)X−1 = (bi)M−1.
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We denote the vector made with the n first elements of (bi)M−1 by v. We
have
vT =

b1u1 + b2u2 + · · ·+ bn−k+1un−k+1
b2u1 + b3u2 + · · ·+ bn−k+2un−k+1
...
bnu1 + bn+1u2 + · · ·+ b2n−kun−k+1

So v is the sum of the row of the following matrix.

b1u1 b2u1 . . . bnu1
b2u2 b3u2 . . . bn+1u2
...
...
. . .
...
bn−k+1un−k+1 bn−k+2un−k+1 . . . b2n−kun−k+1

Notice that each one of the rows of the previous matrix can be generated by
the same linear feedback-shift register of order L(bi). Therefore, v can also be
generated by that same linear feedback-shift register of order L(bi), i.e. L(v) ≤
L(bi) ≤ 2t. Now, we have that the n first elements of (ci)X−1 are
(ci)′ = m[0|G1] + v.
Since t < n−k+14 and L(v) ≤ 2t, then L(v) < n−k+12 so that we can use the
decoding algorithm on the set of sequences generated by the rows of [0|G1] to
get m[0|G1]. At the end, we use the inverse of G1 to recover m.
Let us explain why we choose the above construction. Since we cannot choose
[0|G1] as public key, we added more columns from G2. Then we scrambles all
the columns together via M in such a way that GM looks random. Also, the
choices of M was done in such a way that at the end, we are able to make a
unique decoding on the set of sequences generated by 0|G1].
The use of matrix H is also important. Namely, if we suppose that H is only
the identity matrix, then,
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G′

c1 0 . . . 0
c2 c1
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . . c2 c1
...
. . .
. . . c2
cn−k+1
. . .
. . .
...
0 cn−k+1
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
...
0 . . . 0 cn−k+1

= [0|G1]. (5.2)
Then we can just use this equation to find an alternative value for the ui’s.
This will help in recovering an alternative secret key for the decryption. This
is easy to solve as we have linear equations. However, as we will see in the
next section, the use of H introduces non-linearity and thus helps to avoid the
recovering of the secret key by simple linear algebra.
5.4.1 Cryptanalysis on the cryptosystem
Key recovery attack
One possible attack is given by the following. It consists in trying to recover a
possible alternative for the secret key.
We suppose that the attacker knows G′ = GX, where X−1 = HM−1 such
that M−1 has the form as in Equation (5.1), H = diag(h1, · · · , h2n−k) and
G = [0|G1|G2].
Now, X−1 is of the form HM−1. The first possibility is to guess the value
of H. In case a correct value for H is produced, then the attacker is left with
computing the solution of a system in the form of Equation (5.2). In order to
avoid this attack, we have to choose the field Fq to be large enough so that
making a correct guess for H is difficult. Notice that by Corollary 4, the number
of sequences with linear complexity 2, is equal to q3(q − 1) ' q4. Furthermore,
guessing a correct value of M−1 is also difficult for large field.
The second possibility is that, the attacker may want to directly solve the
equation
G′HM−1 = [0|G1|G2]. (5.3)
Here G′ is the only known element in this equation. Furthermore, by considering
the form of H, which is made of a finite sequence of linear complexity 2, and
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also the form of M−1, these two matrices introduce 2n2− 3nk+ k2 +n− k+ 5
variables. Even so, we did not yet consider the variables from G1 and G2. Here
the contribution of H is just four variables, namely the initial terms and the
coefficients of the linear feedback-shift register generating the hi’s.
Notice that the diagonal elements of H is of the form
(h1, h2, h3, · · · · · · ) =
(µ1, µ2, λ1µ1 + λ2µ2, λ1µ2 + λ2(λ1µ1 + λ2µ2), · · · · · · ).
We can easily see that GX−1 gives polynomial equations of degree 2n − k
in the variables from the entries of M−1 and the linear feedback-shift register
generating the hi’s. The high degree is indeed from the expression of the entries
of H. To conclude, the attacker has the task of solving a system of polynomials
of large degree in many variables. Such problem is hard in general, even when
the base field is F2 (See for example [GJ90], Appendix A7). However, we must
choose proper values for the parameters n, k, q in order to avoid algorithms for
computing some Gröbner basis which help in solving these systems of polynomial
equations.
Brute force attack on the ciphertext
The following attack is on the general scheme. It consists of randomly guessing
the error sequence (ei) in the encryption. By Theorem 25, there are b(2n −
k, t)− 1 possibilities for the errors with linear complexity r such that 1 ≤ r ≤ t,
where
b(2n− k, t) =

q2t+1+1
q+1 if t ≤ n− k2 − 12 ,
1−q2(n−t)
1+q + q
n if t ≥ n− k2 .
Since we have to choose L(ei) ≤ t, with t < n−k+14 , then the number of
possible error vectors that we can choose is
b(2n− k, t) = q
2t+1 + 1
q + 1 ' q
2t. (5.4)
Therefore , about q2t guesses are needed to decrypt the ciphertext. Of course
this can be optimized so that only half guesses are needed. Notice that the
linear complexity offers an advantage against the McEliece cryptosystem using
Hamming metric. Namely, even if the linear complexity of an error vector is
small, it is highly possible that all the entries of the error vector are non-zero i.e.
its Hamming weight is very large. This limits the possibility of the use of the
information set decoding attack like on the original McEliece cryptosystem. In
the McEliece cryptosystem, the attackers only need to guess the position of the
5.4. A PARTICULAR CONSTRUCTION 85
error but do not need the values of the error. There, working with a large field
does not really help against the information set decoding attack. In contrast to
this, working with large fields increase the difficulty of guessing the error vector
when we work with the metric defined by the linear complexity. Namely, the
exact value of the error vector is needed when we make a guess.
We have the following example for parameters when taking into account the
two previous attacks.
Example 4. We choose q = 232, k = 16, n = 24, t = 2. The encryption rate is
1/2. The public key size is approximately 16 Kbits. Considering the key recov-
ering attack and by using Corollary 4, there are q2r−1(q − 1) ' q2r possibilities
for the choice of H, where r = 2. This is approximately 2128. For the second
attack, the error vector which we introduce when encrypting has weight at most
2. Using Equation (5.4), there are approximately 2128 possibilities for the error
vector. The security of the cryptosystem is about 128-bit. The key recovering
attack is already difficult but also a brute force on the ciphertext needs about
2128 operations in F232 .
The number of choices for the matrix H as well as the number of choices
for the error vector mainly depends on the size of the field but not on the length
of the vector. Therefore, this cryptosystem works better with large field. The
cryptosystem has an advantage against the McEliece cryptosystems as we are
using smaller key size. Namely, Bernstein et al. have the following parameters
for the original McEliece cryptosystem using Goppa codes [BLP08]. For an 80-
bit security, the public key size is 520 Kbits. For 128-bit security, the public key
size is 1357 Kbits. These key sizes are large if we compare to our earlier example
of parameters. We would like to point out that for the new cryptosystem, we
have only considered the security of the cryptosystem against two attacks, which
are mainly brute force attacks. the suggested parameters are just to emphasize
the fact that the cryptosystem can help in reducing the public key size in code
based cryptosystems. A reason for this reduction of key sizes is explained by the
following
• For Hamming metric if we consider and error vector of weight t and length
n, then we need to choose t non-zero elements in the field Fq. Then we
spread these elements across only t positions noting that n − t positions
still have the value 0.
• For the rank metric, if the error vector has weight t, then we also need
to choose t non-zero elements of Fqm which are linearly independent over
Fq. The errors will be spread across all the n positions but using linear
combinations over the smaller field Fq only.
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• For the linear complexity metric, suppose also that the error vector has
weight t. We need to choose t non-zero elements of a field Fq. However,
via the recurrence formula of a linear feedback-shift register, we spread the
errors to all positions but also the linear combinations are done within the
field Fq itself. In contrast to the rank metric setting we do not move to
a smaller field to choose the linear combination and thus we have more
choice for the coefficients of the linear combination.
More cryptanalysis should be done in order to find the right parameters for
the cryptosystem. For instance, we need to have a look at a Gröbner basis attack
for recovering alternative secret keys. Considering this attack we may have to
further increase the paramaters and thus we get a larger public key size. Still, I
do not expect the public key size to be as large as suggested in [BLP08] for the
McEliece cryptosystem.
5.5 Linear complexity coset weight problem
Recall the following problem which we have already stated in a previous section.
Linear complexity coset weight problem: Given a random subspace S
of Fnq , a finite sequence (bi) ∈ Fnq and a positive integer w, find the sequence
(ai) ∈ S such that d((ai), (bi)) ≤ w.
To show the difficulty of solving this problem, we will show that the coset
weight problem which we state below can be reduced to the linear complexity
coset weight problem.
Coset weight problem: Let w be a positive integer. Let C be a random
linear code over a finite field Fq together with the Hamming distance dH . Given
a vector x ∈ Fnq , find the codeword c ∈ C such that dH(c,x) ≤ w.
To do this let us recall the following notion from complexity theory.
Definition 37. A problem P is said to be in the class NP if given a solution to
P , there is an algorithm which can verify the solution in polynomial time.
Here, we gave an equivalent definition of NP. Usually, NP problems are de-
fined to be the problems which can be solved in polynomial time using a non-
deterministic Turing machine.
Definition 38. A problem P is called NP-hard if any problem in NP can be
reduced to P in polynomial time.
Definition 39. If a problem is both in NP and NP-hard, then it is called NP-
complete.
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NP-complete problems are considered to be intractable. One example of an
NP-complete problem is the coset weight problem as it was proven in [BMvT78].
Theorem 27 ([BMvT78]). The coset weight problem is NP-complete.
We will use this result to show that the linear complexity coset weight problem
is also NP-complete. First of all, it is easy to see that the problem is in NP. To
show the NP-hardness, we will need to translate the notion of Hamming distance
into the notion of linear complexity. For that we need the following theorem of
König-Rados which we have already seen in Chapter 4.
Theorem 28 (König-Rados, [LN96]). Let f(x) = f0 + f1x + · · · + fQ−2xQ−2
be a polynomial over a finite field FQ of size Q. Then the number of roots of of
f(x) in F∗Q is given by Q− 1− r, where r is the rank of the matrix
A =

f0 f1 . . . fQ−2
f1 .
. . . .
.
f0
... . .
.
. .
. ...
fQ−2 f0 . . . fQ−3
 .
Notice that if r is the rank ofA in the previous theorem, then for i > r, the i-
th row ofA is a linear combination of the r first rows ofA. Therefore, the (r+1)-
th row of A is a linear combination of the r first rows. Thus, (f0, f1, . . . , fQ−2)
can be generated by an LFSR of order r and it is (Q − 1)-periodic. So we can
say that (f0, f1, . . . , fQ−2, f0, f1, . . . , fQ−2) has linear complexity r ≤ Q − 1.
We claim that it cannot be generated by a shorter LFSR. Otherwise, by the
periodicity, one can show that A has rank smaller than r. We thus have shown
that the linear complexity of (f0, f1, . . . , fQ−2, f0, f1, . . . , fQ−2) is equal to r.
Now, let us see how we can convert a linear code into a subspace of sequences.
Suppose that we have a finite field Fq with q elements. Assume that C ⊂ Fnq .
Let l =
⌈
logq(n)
⌉
and suppose that Q = ql. For an element (c1, · · · , cn) ∈
Fnq , we extend it to c = (c1, · · · , cn, 0 · · · , 0) ∈ FQ−1q . If we suppose that
{a1, · · · , aQ−1} = F∗Q, then any c can be written as
c = (f(a1), · · · , f(aQ−1)),
for some polynomial f(x) of degree Q− 2 over FQ. Now, the Hamming weight
of (c1, · · · , cn) is equal to the Hamming weight of c. Using Theorem 28 and
the above discussion, we see that the Hamming weight of c is the same as the
linear complexity of (f0, f1, . . . , fQ−2, f0, f1, . . . , fQ−2). Therefore we have the
following correspondence.
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{
Linear code in Fnq of dimension k
metric using the Hamming weight
}
m (5.5)
Vector space of (Q− 1)-periodic sequences in F2(Q−1)Q of dimension k
metric using the Linear complexity
Linear complexity of the sequence is Q− 1 at most

In the Correspondence (5.5), if a sequence (ai) corresponds to a codeword c,
the linear complexity of (ai) is equal to the Hamming weight of c. The minimum
distance of these sets are the same.
Using the Correspondence (5.5), we now translate the coset weight problem
into an instance of the linear complexity coset weight problem. In other words,
a problem of finding the closest codewords in a linear codes will be translated
into a problem of find the closest sequence with respect to the linear complexity
metric. The setting for the linear code is the following.
Problem 1
• C is a linear code of dimension k in Fnq .
• x′ is a vector in Fnq .
• w is a positive integer.
• Find c′ ∈ C such that the Hamming weight of x′ − c′ is at most w.
The problem is transformed into a problem of finding the closest sequence as
follows.
Problem 2
• S a subspace of dimension k of sequences in F2(Q−1)Q of the form
(f0, · · · , fQ−2, f0, · · · , fQ−2),
and linear complexity are at most Q− 1.
• x a vector of the form (x0, · · · , xQ−2, x0, · · · , xQ−2) ∈ F2(Q−1)Q with linear
complexity at most Q− 1.
• w is a positive integer.
5.6. CONCLUSION 89
• Find c ∈ S such that the linear complexity of x − c is at most w with
w ≤ Q− 1.
Now if it is easy to solve the linear complexity coset weight problem in general
with some known algorithm, then we can use that algorithm to solve Problem 2.
Since the solution x is such that x− c has linear complexity Q− 1 at most and
that x−c must also have the form (f0, · · · , fQ−2, f0, · · · , fQ−2) ∈ F2(Q−1)Q , then
the algorithm must output a solution for Problem 2. But this means that we
are able to solve Problem 1. Therefore, it is also easy to solve the coset weight
problem.
Remark 15.
(i) The condition for the linear complexity to be Q − 1 at most and that
the sequences are of the form (x0, · · · , xQ−2, x0, · · · , xQ−2) are important.
Namely this ensure that the LFSR generating x − c is Q − 1 periodic so
that a solution to Problem 2 is a solution to Problem 1.
(ii) Switching from the field Fq of size q to the field FQ with Q = qdlogq(n)e
does not increase the difficulty of the problem exponentially.
In other words, solving a coset weight problem over Fnq , with ]Fq = q, can be
reduced to solving a linear complexity coset weight problem over F2(Q−1)Q . Thus,
we have the following theorem.
Theorem 29. Solving the linear complexity coset weight problem is at least as
hard as solving the coset weight problem.
Since solving a general coset weight problem problem is suggested to be a
hard problem [BMvT78], we can also conclude that solving the linear complexity
coset weight problem is a hard problem.
Theorem 30.
Solving the linear complexity coset weight problem is NP-complete.
5.6 Conclusion
In this work, we have devised a new general cryptosystem based on linear com-
plexity. We have provided a basis of why the general cryptosystem is secure by
showing that the problem on which it is based on is a difficult problem. Namely,
our new cryptosystem is based on the difficulty of solving the linear complex-
ity coset weight problem. And we have shown that the linear complexity coset
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weight problem is at least as hard as the coset weight problem. This later prob-
lem is the problem on which the McEliece cryptosystem is based on. We have
also provided a construction for the new cryptosystem. We have suggested some
parameters based on some attacks which are mainly brute force attack. These
attacks consist of recovering the secret key, or randomly guessing the error in-
troduced in the encryption. As a future work, we will look into this construction
more closely. We want to investigate algebraic attacks on the cryptosystem.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Apart from their application in network coding, rank metric codes have found
applications in cryptography. Using the fact that it is difficult to decode a ran-
dom linear code, a cryptosystem was devised by McEliece where messages are
encoded via a specific linear code and encryption is done by adding some noise
to the codeword. The disadvantage of the original scheme by McEliece is that it
requires the use of large public keys. In order to avoid this, the use of classes of
optimal codes were suggested. These classes are called maximum rank distance
codes in the rank metric setting. Among them, there are the Gabidulin codes.
Unfortunately, cryptosystem based on Gabidulin codes were shown to be insecure
and therefore we need to find alternative codes.
The first result we have given was that there are indeed many linear codes
which have a maximum rank distance over large fields. We have given a theoret-
ical as well as a probabilistic proof for this existence. Furthermore, most of the
maximum rank distance codes are not Gabidulin codes. In terms of probability
we have the following results:
Let Fqm/Fq be a field extension of finite degree. Given a randomly generated
matrix X ∈ Fk×(n−k)qm , the probability that the matrix [Ik|X] generates a maxi-
mum rank distance code of length n and dimension k over the extension Fqm/Fq
is,
Pr([Ik|X] generates an MRD code ) ≥ 1−
k∑
i=0
i
(
k
k − i
)
q
(
n− k
i
)
q
qi
2
q−m.
When m goes to infinity, then the right-hand side of the inequality goes to 1. We
can translate this result to the following statement: When the field Fqm is large
enough, then with high probability, a randomly generated code is a maximum
rank distance code.
For the question of generating Gabidulin codes, we got the following result.
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Let X ∈ Fk×(n−k)qm be randomly chosen. Then the probability that [Ik|X]
generates a generalized Gabidulin code of length n and dimension k over the
extension Fqm/Fq is,
Pr([Ik|X] generates a gen. Gabidulin code) ≤ φ(m)q−(m−1)(n−k−1)(k−1).
When m goes to infinity, then the right hand side goes to 0 and therefore,
when the field is large enough, it is unlikely that we get a Gabidulin code. A
construction of twisted Gabidulin codes by Sheekey gives a new class which
contains codes which are not equivalent to any Gabidulin codes. To further
confirm this existence theorem, we also have given a construction of a new
class of rank metric codes via the use of derivation on polynomial rings. This
construction produces codes which are different from (twisted) Gabidulin codes.
For a code to be useful in cryptography, a decoding algorithm is needed.
For twisted Gabidulin codes, there were no decoding algorithm until we started
this work. In this thesis, we gave two different decoding algorithms for twisted
Gabidulin codes. For the second algorithm, it is different from any existing
algorithm when we apply it to the classical Gabidulin codes. This algorithm uses
the notion of linear complexity for some general linear feedback-shift register and
it allows us to use the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm in a different way. From this,
we notice that there is a connection between the notion of linear complexity of
sequences and the notion of weight of codewords.
We thus investigated this relation between the weight of codewords and the
linear complexity of sequences, but we switched to the setting of Hamming metric
codes. This equivalence is described as follows.
Let Fq = {0, α1, · · · , αq−1} be a finite field with q elements. Let f(x) =
a0+a1x+ · · ·+aq−2xq−2 be a polynomial over Fq. Then the Hamming weight of
(f(α1), · · · , f(αq−1)) is equal to the linear complexity of the periodic sequence
(a0, · · · , aq−2).
This equivalence holds with the setting that the sequences, we consider, have
a fixed period q−1. This leads us to think of the setting where we do not restrict
the sequences to have a fixed period. It turns out that in this case, the linear
complexity defines a metric on the vector space Fnq . Therefore, we can make
a new coding theory by using this new metric. We have developed the theory
which are necessary for application in cryptography. We have for instance given
a proof that the number b(n, r) of sequences of length n over Fq with linear
complexity at most r is
(i) if r = 0, b(n, 0) = 1,
(ii) if r + 1 ≤ n− r,
b(n, r) = q
2r+1 + 1
q + 1 ,
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(iii) if n− r ≤ r,
b(n, r) = 1− q
2(n−r)
1 + q + q
n.
Finally, we use these results to construct a new cryptosystem. We have given
the general construction and we have proved that decoding random linear codes
with respect to the linear complexity is also a difficult problem. This forms
the basis for the security of the new cryptosystem. We have given a particular
instance of the cryptosystem and we have given some parameters suggestion. One
of the primary goal of the thesis was to show that using the linear complexity as
a metric helps in reducing the public key sizes for the cryptosystem.
Future work
The cryptosystem based on the linear complexity of sequences is completely new.
A lot of work still has to be done before the cryptosystem is ready for practical
use. Our goal in the thesis was to provide the foundation of the theory. We have
suggested a particular construction. However, we mainly considered the brute
force attack against the cryptosystem. We have also seen that some attack can
be reduced to solving a system of multivariate polynomial equations. There are
many algorithms which can be used to try to solve these problems. In general
these algorithms do not always work as each specific system of equations has its
own way of solving it. To this regard, we will need to analyze algorithms which can
be applied to recover the secret key in our cryptosystem. We need to investigate
the speed-up provided by such attack in order to find the right parameters for our
cryptosystem. Therefore, as a future work, we want to analyze our cryptosystem
against these attacks on solving a system of multivariate polynomial equations.
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